The former President of the Constitutional Court and Minister of Justice, Alexandru Tănase, gave an extensive interview for the Foreign Policy Bulletin, outlining his vision on justice reform in the Republic of Moldova. The former official emphasized that the greatest danger lies in the politicization of justice reform. He also noted that there is a growing perception that the emphasis on speed—at the expense of quality—is not viewed favourably in Brussels. In his opinion, priority should be given, first and foremost, to resolving the everyday cases of citizens seeking justice in courts, as well as commercial disputes. At the same time, Alexandru Tănase stressed that, particularly in cases of high-level corruption, the priority must be the quality of justice, in order to avoid creating the perception of selective or politicized justice. We invite you to explore these issues in detail in the interview below:

- Mr. Tănase, if we were to take stock of the last five years of governance in terms of justice reform, what do you consider to be the main achievements, as well as the biggest failures?

- I do not know if there is an exhaustive answer to this question. The situation is highly nuanced, and the answer lies somewhere in the middle. There have also been positive aspects of this justice reform. First of all, we can speak about a cleansing of the judiciary through the removal of certain groups and toxic individuals who effectively held the justice system hostage for 20 years. They shaped it into the form we have seen. I believe the reform has had positive effects as well.

When we speak about negative effects or failures, I think these relate more to the procedures through which these actions were carried out. More precisely, what began as a judicial reform has gradually turned into something that resembles more a system of control than a genuine effort to build a new justice system.

A truly sustainable reform—one embraced by society as a whole and free from persistent suspicions of clientelism—has not been achieved. This is the core problem.

Realities and perceptions

- How do you assess the vetting process of judges and prosecutors? Do you believe it is being carried out on sound grounds and that it will truly lead to a genuine cleansing of the justice system?

- It is difficult to predict the final outcome of this process. One thing, however, is certain: the lack of transparency and the way authorities have communicated about the process have significantly undermined its credibility. If we look not so much at reality, but at public perception, it becomes clear that the level of trust is very low. This undoubtedly represents a major failure of the current government.

Perhaps things should have been designed differently and implemented according to a clearer agenda and timeline. Moreover, the fact that the bodies responsible for this process have been staffed with individuals perceived as being exclusively close to or controlled by the current authorities—without the inclusion of more neutral figures or representatives of the opposition—has not helped to strengthen its credibility.

Between cosmetic fixes and realities

- How do you assess the episode of reappointing Herman von Hebel to the vetting commission for prosecutors, and why do you think PAS insisted on this appointment despite widespread opposition? To what extent could this influence the European Union’s assessment of the rule of law?

- This episode will certainly influence the European Union’s assessment of the rule of law. There should be no doubt about that. Even though those in power have tried to soften public perception through various justifications, we witnessed an unprecedented situation in which there was virtually no supportive voice for this appointment.

Moreover, there is no solid argument for imposing a person who, in public perception, is considered compromised, simply because he is loyal and executes what is required of him.

For this reason, I believe the very existence of this issue represents a major mistake, especially given the way in which the appointment was carried out, including through amendments to special legislation to enable it.

This is all the more problematic given the serious doubts surrounding this individual, particularly regarding alleged irregularities during his time as an administrator at the International Criminal Court. In this context, a more neutral candidate could have been selected, allowing society to perceive the process as balanced and avoiding the impression that laws are tailored for a single individual. This is, essentially, the core problem.

Institutional capacity and lack of attractiveness

- Does Moldova have sufficient capacity and human resources to replace the judges and prosecutors who have left the system following vetting? How might this affect the system’s functionality?

- I do not believe we have sufficient resources for a rapid replacement. In fact, the issue of rapid replacement does not even arise, as many of the departures have already begun to be compensated.

There remains, however, a problem at the Supreme Court of Justice. Here, the issue is less about resources and more about credibility. There is little interest in participating in the selection process, as it is perceived as largely formal, while decisions are believed to be politically influenced.

It is widely understood that decisions are controlled from a single center of power. This explains the lack of interest in submitting applications and participating in competitions.

As for prosecutors, there is indeed a current deficit, but this is likely to be addressed relatively quickly. The National Institute of Justice trains new prosecutors annually, and, in parallel, some cases can be prioritized while others are postponed.

Of course, none of these solutions is ideal. One cannot create overnight a body of 200 judges and 200 prosecutors. Nevertheless, I do not believe we are facing a situation that would generate major dysfunctions that cannot be overcome.

- How do you assess the handling of high profile cases today? Can they be examined swiftly without compromising quality?

- I have certain reservations when I observe the speed with which some cases are examined. Based on what is visible in the public space, I cannot say with certainty whether these proceedings are also of high quality. In criminal matters, quality must prevail. A Stakhanovite pace never produces good results.

While society may applaud such developments, genuine justice cannot be built on low-quality decisions or on unlawful solutions adopted merely to meet public expectations.

It remains to be seen whether these cases are solidly substantiated and whether the evidence is truly relevant. In complex cases, where hearings take place almost daily, this pace may satisfy public demand, but the experience of other countries shows that this is not how justice works.

Complex criminal cases require thorough debate across multiple dimensions, particularly since they involve the liberty of individuals. Parties must have sufficient time to conduct their own expert analyses and build a proper defense.

Under such circumstances, when a judgment is delivered in a case comprising 300 volumes in just 16 days, there are legitimate grounds to question whether due process was fully respected.

Many institutions, few results

- Do you see the creation of PACCO as a genuine reform? Should APO and PCCOCS be maintained, or reorganized into a stronger institution similar to Romania’s DNA?

- PCCOCS does not have responsibilities in combating corruption—that role belongs to the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. We also have the National Anti-Corruption Center and numerous other institutions involved in this field. In practice, every second official is engaged, in one way or another, in anti-corruption efforts, yet the results are well known.

It is therefore unclear to me why merging PCCOCS and PA would lead to greater effectiveness. The core issue is one of human resources. If neither institution has sufficient specialists, renaming or restructuring them repeatedly will not produce better outcomes.

As for the proposed merger, I do not see how it could be implemented coherently. Its logic appears less institutional and more political— specifically aimed at removing the former head of APO, Veronica Dragalin. This seems to have been the primary motivation behind the initiative.

The EU and the perspective of justice reform

- Are current reforms sufficient to convince the EU that Moldova can build an independent justice system?

- The rule of law does not mean delivering convictions on an assembly line. Nor does it mean endlessly merging institutions or expanding bureaucracies. It does not mean assigning ranks to every second official.

The rule of law is about the genuine ability of justice to deliver justice. And justice does not necessarily align with the expectations of political power.

It will be difficult to convince the European Union that a genuine reform has taken place based solely on criminal justice outcomes. Criminal cases account for only 5–7 percent of all cases in courts.

The real core lies in civil and commercial cases, where many problems persist. There appears to be little attention from authorities in this area.

EU evaluators will not rely on news headlines. They will assess reforms in a multidimensional way—examining procedural law, substantive law, and institutional compatibility with EU standards.

This is a complex process, and I have serious reservations about whether current institutional capacities and human resources are sufficient to deliver results that the EU would recognize as genuine progress.

Without politicization

- How can the perception that justice reform is politically driven be avoided?

- This perception can only be avoided if Parliament respects and adopts laws in their original form, without ad hoc amendments designed to promote specific individuals—as seen in the recent case involving Herman von Hebel.

Otherwise, we are no longer dealing with genuine reform, but with the risk of bringing the judiciary under political control. No communication strategy or image campaign can offset this perception as long as such practices continue.

- If we look back at the last 10–15 years of justice reforms in the Republic of Moldova, what do you consider to be the main lessons we should learn?

- This issue goes beyond the last 10–15 years—it concerns the entire period since Moldova’s independence in 1991. Justice is a fundamental pillar of the rule of law. It must deliver justice and must not align itself with political power.

Judicial independence is not about independence from local councils or ministries—it is about independence from political authority, the ability to make decisions free from political influence. This remains the core problem, unresolved for over three decades.

Every change in political power is followed by investigations against former leaders. With each new shift, the Prosecutor General is replaced. No Prosecutor General has completed their full mandate without becoming involved in actions against political opponents.

This is the fundamental issue. A justice system that truly delivers justice must act impartially—holding both former and current leaders accountable based on facts, not political affiliation. Over more than 30 years of independence, Moldova has moved, in many respects, in the opposite direction. This remains the central challenge.

- Thank you!