The political analyst and journalist from Chernivtsi, Marin Gherman, spoke for the FES/APE foreign policy bulletin about Kiev’s plans regarding the war, but also the approach to rebuilding Ukraine. We discussed tactical aspects of the battlefield, the political stakes of the European and US elections, but also the strategic triangle in the region that Ukraine, Romania and the Republic of Moldova could form. All these aspects can be found in the following interview:

- How is the situation in Ukraine currently? How are the Ukrainian troops coping and what are Kiev’s expectations in the confrontation with the Russian army?

- First of all, it seems that the most difficult periods and moments of this confrontation have passed for Kiev this year in the context of the offensive in the east, in the Kharkiv region and other provocations that were organized and planned by Russia. Kiev has managed and three is no longer that great danger as it appeared at the beginning of this year in Karkov, Sumy and the opening of a front for Ukraine. The parties cannot achieve spectacular and quick results in a short period of time, a game of chess in which Russia from time to time takes the initiative and control over some territories, in other words occupies them, then Kiev makes efforts and liberates them, and also a game of ping-pong in which Russia has a tactical but not a strategic initiative.

So we cannot expect something spectacular, similar to the Ukrainian offensive from September 2022, but neither can we expect a collapse of the front, as the Russian propaganda is telling us. There are certain problems, of course, in Ukraine, and not only with ammunition, but also with encouraging the population, maintaining the fighting spirit, encouraging mobilization, a war fatigue.

These are all problems that have accumulated and it remains to be seen how Ukraine will be able to successfully manage them, as the obsolescence of this war also implies a change in communication tactics with society, which for now I do not see it happening very well for Kiev.

Compromise scenarios

- Are we far from a peace agreement at this point? Can Russia be forced by the international community to accept a peace on the terms of the withdrawal of its troops from the conquered Ukrainian territories? We have no peace formula in the year 2024.

- We only have names, but no peace formulas. Volodymyr Zelensky’s peace formula means Russia’s capitulation, Vladimir Putin’s peace formula means Ukraine’s capitulation.

The other peace formulas do not include mechanisms to resolve this conflict. When we talk about a peace agreement on the territory of Ukraine, I do not think that this could happen in the coming months. I do not rule out that there could somehow be a fragile truce, but not a peace.

Second, what does peace mean in this war? That is another discussion, and what a victory and defeat means for all parties involved in this conflict is another discussion.

At the same time, I don’t think there will be enough arguments, but also strategic capabilities from the West and Ukraine to force Putin to withdraw, but the discussion is whether or not Zelenskiy and Ukrainian society will agree to accept a armistice in the context in which not all Ukrainian territories were liberated.

So, about a peace that would mean a cease-fire, de-escalation, demining the territories and the withdrawal of troops from both sides, I don’t think it will happen next year either. A truce will only be possible if both sides understand that they do not have enough resources for combat operations, they need to regroup. The stakes and resources have changed a lot, which could happen by the end of this year, so that early next year we’ll have a new setup. Until then, I think that in this hybrid context, the war will continue as we see it at the moment.

In addition, Ukraine has changed its legislation, is trying to mobilize new and new forces and men in this war, and is keeping an eye on the elections in the United States of America, which are likely to change this discussion greatly after November-December, when there will be elections for a new head of the White House.

Strategies for the reconstruction of Ukraine

- What effects has the war left so far and what are the estimates, if any, for the reconstruction of Ukraine? How expensive and difficult will this process of rebuilding Ukraine be?

- It is a very painful subject, because the Kiev School of Economics calculates the cost of the war every day and also has a website with all the destroyed targets, including those under reconstruction. Even now they are renovating some of the facilities, spending billions of dollars on this process, and the numbers are increasing day by day.

It’s a painful subject from two perspectives: a symbolic one, namely the date of 24 February 2022 meant a dilemma for the Ukrainian leadership, whether to fight or accept the conditions of the Russian Federation and take revenge later.

Both Ukraine and the Ukrainian society agreed to the continuation of the struggle against the aggression of the Russian Federation. At the moment, after two and a half years of war, many Ukrainians are wondering, as sociological polls show us, whether this very great effort was worth it in the context of the destruction that was caused.

Why is this happening? Because some believe the Russian propaganda which is telling the Ukrainians that in reality we have electricity, but the Ukrainian oligarchs are selling it to the European Union.

The Ukrainian authorities have also not been very good at communicating with the citizens and explaining to them in the third year of the war what is really happening with the Ukrainian energy system. And this war fatigue creates many, many difficulties, but the issue of Ukrainian renovation and reconstruction will be topical, regardless of how this war ends.

The discussion goes on. If in 2022 we were discussing a possible victory of Ukraine, or a cessation of fighting for a Ukrainian reconstruction, at the moment the question arises how to do it today, because there are increased needs in this process today, in the context of the destruction of the energy infrastructure, critical infrastructure and many other challenges that need to be addressed as they arise.

- I have read a very interesting study recently estimating that about 80% of the resources needed for the reconstruction of Ukraine are already on the territory of Ukraine and should not be imported precisely in order to boost Ukraine’s war-affected economy. How do you see it, should Ukraine primarily use these domestic resources and then export certain raw materials needed in the reconstruction process, or simply leave the market open for the reconstruction of Ukraine?

- I think that the best example was that of the European states after the end of the Second World War. And there was even talk of a “Marshall Plan 2” for Ukraine last year. The European Union did not bring cement and sand from the United States of America after the Second World War, but used its domestic resources.

It is true that Ukraine has very important natural resources for the reconstruction - building materials, labour, technologies, and experienced people. This process would greatly stimulate the Ukrainian economy. But this discussion is again about a possible peace or armistice in Ukraine. It’s hard to build a logistics of these works, because missiles can fall and destroy everything you’ve built. This happened and they destroyed the construction sites as well as the people who worked there.

In times of peace, the paradigm and the way of thinking are different when the resources are sufficient, but we need, of course, financial resources to start this economic engine in Ukraine and we also need the support of the neighbours, including the Republic of Moldova, Romania and other neighbouring states, which could help through consultancy and expertise.

The perspectives of trilateral collaboration

- How do you see the trilateral collaboration at this moment between Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Romania? How important is the development of cooperation between the three states in the region?

- This geopolitical triangle that I and other international relations scholars have long promoted has been overshadowed by major geopolitical challenges in the past. And it was somehow left out. Kyiv did not consider developing its relations with the Republic of Moldova and Romania as its priority.

But things have changed a lot after 2014, and especially now. The misfortune of the war makes Kiev look more and more closely at the Republic of Moldova and Romania, as a space of friendship. Of course, through the prism of the political decision-makers in Kiev, the Republic of Moldova is seen, on the one hand, as a partner, and on the other hand, as a source of destabilization in the context of the electoral processes and the communities there, as a friend, not an enemy, and this changed in Ukraine tremendously after February 24, 2022.

When we talk about Romania, we are talking about a NATO member state and a member of the European Union. Romania represents a pillar of support for Ukraine in the context of defensive efforts. Many of the problematic files from the past, are being solved, step by step, including the issues of the Bâstroe canal, Snake Island, the problem of the Romanian national minorities in Ukraine.

These discussion files have started to be separated and segmented as they should be, in a European spirit. Step by step, things are changing, moving towards a normalization of the relations.

In addition, we also have this initiative - to create a strategic partnership between Ukraine and Romania. Of course, things are not moving as fast as we wanted, but they are changing a lot, step by step.

And last but not least, we must mention the fact that Romania can turn into an important actor that exports stability and security to Ukraine. Romania in Ukraine are now mentioned in terms of stability, security, NATO. This matters a lot to the political decision-makers and expert community in Kiev. We wanted very much for this trilateral Kiev-Bucharest-Chisinau to develop.

Much also depends on the results of the elections to be held on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, so that it is a cemented geopolitical triangle, from all points of view.

We also have a geopolitical small train that goes from Kiev and Chisinau to Brussels. Both states have launched the process of negotiations for joining the European Union and, of course, both capitals need the support of Bucharest, so that Romania continues to be a reliable advocate for both capitals. And there are, as you can see, many aspects that can be developed in the future if the military, geopolitical configurations are favorable.

- Regarding the opening of the negotiation chapter with the European Union, both by Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, how difficult will it be for Ukraine in war conditions to make reforms because we know that this is a technical process that usually takes many years, many resources that need to be invested, administrative capacity and so on?

- The war is a challenge. At the same time, the war is no longer an excuse when talking about Kiev’s promise to carry out reforms. Once you undertake these reforms, you must move on. And the second problem in this context is the possible resistance that will be manifested if we talk about the western regions, where there is openness to change the administrative configurations, as requested by the European Union, but there are also other Ukrainian regions where this resistance will be present.

Why do we need to change certain things? Why do we need to be much more transparent as political decision makers and local administrations, why do we need all these things? The idea of European integration is not seen the same way everywhere.

This is generally supported, and for this, in fact, the Ukrainian military, who fight against the aggression of the Russian Federation, give their lives. But when we talk about Europe and European integration, these notions are seen differently in different regions of Ukraine, and this is also shown by sociological studies.

If somewhere in the south of the country, when we talk about European integration, people do not agree with the change of the way of life. And the European integration means giving up many things that are not good for us.

In the west of the country, things are seen much more realistically, because the contact with the European Union in the west of the country was much more accentuated during the last decades. People have seen what the spirit of freedom means and how a European institution is built anywhere in the world.

How Kiev manages these two challenges— war and resistance and opposition to reforms by local elites and the population—will determine Kiev’s success or failure. The Ukrainian authorities must come up with plausible explanations and some related to strategic communication with the population, and all this in the context of the Russian aggression. It’s very complicated and I don’t think any of the political analysts would have the guts to say when all these things might come to an end.

And perhaps the saddest thing for Kiev is that there are no more ways to shorten this process, there are no more shortcuts. Kiev found a shortcut and managed to open the file of negotiations with the European Union, but there will be no more. From now on, any shortcut, when we talk about an institutional, economic and political rapprochement with the European Union, would call into question the functionality of the European Union as such.

And I think that we have closed the chapter of the celebration, we are opening the chapter in which we must work and demonstrate through concrete and real facts the availability of Europeanization of society and administrative mechanisms in Ukraine.

The US election stakes

- How important for Ukraine is what happens with the elections of the White House? Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky maintained good relations with Joe Biden, but recently spoke on the phone with Donald Trump. How important is it to Kiev who will be the next president in the White House, and especially how will the US military support for Ukraine relate to this?

- It is precisely this second aspect that is actually the important one. For Ukraine, it does not necessarily matter who will be the president of the White House, but to what extent it will continue to support Ukraine, at least as well as the Biden administration.

And it doesn’t matter if it’s Donald Trump or somebody else, and it doesn’t matter which party he/she represents, those things are less important. The number one concern in Kiev is that the Ukrainian state is not left by itself, and having to fight by itself against Russia.

Let’s not forget that from May 2022, Ukraine is totally dependent on resources, ammunition, Western support, and especially the American support, which mattered a lot. Let’s just observe how many serious, tragic things for the lives of the people of Ukraine have happened in six months, while the United States of America delayed the support given to Ukraine in the context of this war.

And of course, Kiev thinks that a possible change in the American presidency would mean certain risks for the preservation of the Ukrainian state as such, for its resistance. The latest talks between Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian leadership with the Biden and Trump teams once again demonstrated that Kiev is preparing for any scenarios. No matter who will be the president, Ukraine will discuss with him/her. And if Trump has a very good chance of becoming president, we will enter another scenario in which the leaders of the Eastern European countries, one by one, will try to create new symbolic ties with the leader of the most important state on the planet - the United States of America.

There are also internal messages for the population of Ukraine, somehow as if there is a preparation for the darkest scenarios. The Zelensky administration says that even if the US will not help us as it used to, Ukrainians are willing to fight to the end, even without US support.

But this communication resource of Kiev is somehow exhausted. In 2022, Zelenski was able to get the support of the public opinion, he was on the front pages of newspapers, he was invited by world parliaments and he tried to change the international community’s approach to this war. Now it’s getting harder and harder for him to do this.

Now the interests and agendas of the world’s states have changed and the electoral configurations in Europe do not seem favourable to Ukraine. We have also seen the elections in France and the elections taking place and to be held in other states of the European Union, in addition to the elections in the United States of America — all this could generate a fundamental change in the approach to the subject of the war in Ukraine.

Kiev’s approval or disapproval of a ceasefire will depend on all of these things. So we are talking about the resources and the stakes in this conflict that could change depending on the electoral context.

Thank you!