Vadim Vieru, lawyer and Programme Director at the Promo-LEX Association, gave an interview for the FES/ APE in which we discussed the most important issues highlighted by the PromoLEX lawyer in the latest independent monitoring report assessing the progress of the Republic of Moldova in implementing the European Commission’s recommendations on the „Fundamental Elements” Cluster in the context of accession to the European Union. We discussed respect for human rights, judicial reform, and the extraordinary evaluation of magistrates (vetting), as well as prison conditions and domestic violence. We invite you to read our full interview with lawyer Vadim Vieru:

How are we doing in the area of human rights and have the authorities in Chisinau implemented the EU’s recommendations in this regard? What is the situation with regard to domestic violence, for example?

Visible steps have been taken, but the overall picture remains uneven. There is a framework of policies and functional institutions – the 2023- 2027 National Programme to combat Violence against Women is about 93% complete. The National Agency for the Prevention and Combating of Violence is also operational, while women’s representation in Parliament has exceeded 40%.

In practice, however, effective protection is fragile: almost half of protection orders are violated, while shelters and specialized services are few and underfunded, especially in rural areas. Economic inequalities remain pronounced. For example, in IT, the wage gap rises to 38%.

Progress on Roma inclusion is minimal. Only about 43% of Roma children are effectively integrated into school. In prisons, although there are new food standards and a national human rights plan, overcrowding, violence among inmates, and staff shortages persist; the situation of detained minors is worrying.

National human rights institutions are active but depend too much on external funding, which makes them vulnerable. Conclusion: the direction is right, but implementation on the ground and funding are not yet in line with EU standards.

Shortcomings in public debate

How would you assess the transparency of the current government’s decision-making, given that there have been questions about several bills that were rushed through the legislative process and criticism that they were not coordinated and debated with civil society experts?

On paper, the framework has been improved through adjustments to Law 100/2017, Open Government Partnership commitments, or new National human rights institutions are active, but they depend too much on external funding, which makes them vulnerable 8 Monthly newsletter, No.8 (234), August 2025 modules in e-Parliament. In practice, however, the use of the emergency procedure has become the rule rather than the exception.

To illustrate, the April 2025 budget rectification was promoted at a pace that precluded real debate, and on 10 July 2025, a large volume of projects with missing documentation and shortened deadlines were voted on. The overall picture shows selective transparency, more precisely when the political stakes are high, consultation gives way.

How do you view consultations with civil society and the transparency of certain processes in terms of broader consultation with associations on certain important laws? Have the authorities complied with these EU requirements regarding public debates involving civil society?

The mechanisms exist and, formally, are being used. NGOs participate in 33 out of 35 screening groups, Parliament broadcasts plenary sessions live, and some ministries regularly publish information. In sensitive cases, however, the reflex is to “move quickly.”

I will give you two telling examples in this regard: the budget rectification in April 2025 and the appointments to the Constitutional Court in June 2025 – both without substantial debate. Reporting to EU standards requires predictable consultations, with firm minimum deadlines (20-30 working days for major draft laws) and an explicit obligation to respond to proposals with reasons. There is still work to be done here.

Negative signals

How do you view legislative initiatives such as the merger of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and the PCCOCS into what has been called PACO, a reform that has not been fully implemented? Do such legislative initiatives create confusion in the area of judicial reform?

Yes, they create confusion and instability. In 2023, it was decided to clearly separate competences (APO for large-scale corruption, National Anticorruption Centre for small-scale and systemic corruption), and the structures were just getting back on track.

The “PACO” initiative restarts the game with new rules, without solid impact analyses and without consistent consultations, just when the system needs predictability to deliver results. Frequent conceptual changes demotivate people in institutions and delay cases.

What can you tell us about improving prison conditions? Are they better, and has this been a concern for the authorities?

There is interest and concrete steps have been taken: modernized food standards from 1 January 2025, a contract with UNOPS for the new prison in Chisinau (target 2028), repairs and training for staff. However, fundamental problems remain, such as violence among prisoners, an increase in preventive detention (which fills the cells), a chronic shortage of staff (including medical staff), interrupted IT projects, and funding gaps.

We found serious deficiencies in detention facilities for minors and women. The priority would be to unblock hiring for critical positions, accelerate the construction of the new prison, and transfer prison medicine to the Ministry of Health to stabilize services.

Vetting, between positive and negative aspects

How do you see the vetting process working, considering what has been achieved so far, but also the current backlog, a few months before the legal completion of this process at the end of the year, which will most likely be extended?

Yes, it has delivered important results. The Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors have been completed, evaluations at the Supreme Court of Justice and Courts of Appeal have progressed, and the integrity of governance has been strengthened. However, the collateral cost has been high.

More specifically, there have been massive resignations and an acute shortage of judges at the higher levels. The current pace makes it unlikely that the process will be completed by December 31, 2025, and a controlled extension, with clear monthly milestones, adequate resources, and honest public communication, would allow for completion without blocking the courts.

How do you see retaining and attracting new prosecutors to the system, given the salary and workload? Is it attractive enough to work in the prosecution system today?

No, it is not yet attractive enough. In the AntiCorruption Prosecutor’s Office (APO), the actual number of prosecutors has decreased, the volume of cases has increased, and logistics—space, equipment, expertise—have lagged behind.

Without a competitive salary policy, complete multidisciplinary teams, including seconded criminal investigation officers, and a stable regulatory framework, the attractiveness remains low. This means money, people, and predictable rules – all three at the same time.

How do you see the workload of the courts and what kind of reforms or measures should be taken to ease the huge workload in the courts?

At the grassroots level, we are seeing results: the specialization of panels at the Chișinău District Court has increased the resolution rate and reduced processing times, including for corruption cases. At the top, however, there is suffocation: the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice are left with many vacant positions and interim leadership.

More key measures should be taken, such as rapid competitions for vacant positions, ending the provisional status, complying with the Constitutional Court’s decision on salaries, active case management—filtering repetitive requests, simplified procedures—real digitization (electronic files, online deadlines and summonses), and maintaining specialization in specific areas.

How do you assess the measures taken by the authorities in the fight against corruption, especially in the area of electoral corruption, taking into account the experiences of previous years? Has there been any improvement in this regard or not?

In terms of legislation and oversight, yes, there is Law 100/2025, which tightens sanctions for vote buying and opaque financing, and the Central Election Commission has stepped up its checks and audits of political parties.

In terms of dubious practices, the problem of “fictitious donors” persists, and the current verification threshold—above three average salaries—leaves a substantial gray area.

For the elections on 28 September 2025, three things would matter: lowering the donation verification threshold, making full use of IT systems for “financial control,” and strengthening electoral capacities at the local level.

Also, any new changes to the rules should be consulted with the Venice Commission before adoption to avoid post-factum challenges. Overall, progress is visible in rules and controls, but still insufficient in deterring all stratagems in the field.

Thank you!