Mark Tkaciuk, a member of the Alternativa bloc, gave us an interview for FES/APE foreign policy newsletter in which he spoke about his vision for Moldova’s accession to the EU and the steps that should be taken to achieve this. The parliamentarian emphasised that social issues and the Transnistrian issue should be addressed as a matter of priority in the EU accession process. We also discussed the party’s vision of the socio-economic realities in the Republic of Moldova, as well as the past scenario of the federalisation of the Republic of Moldova desired by Moscow. We invite you to read the full interview below:

How do you assess the dynamics of Moldova’s European course in 2025, as accession negotiations are about to begin? In your opinion, what are the main risks and opportunities of this process?

If I may, I will begin with the opportunities. There is well-known, extensive and multilateral criticism of the current pan-European project. The European Union is no longer what it once was; it is experiencing a systemic crisis and is, according to some, on the verge of disintegration. Internal problems are intensifying — the absence of a unified fiscal policy, the dramatic rise in economic inequality, waves of migration and the far-right nationalist backlash against them, combined with geopolitical and energy vulnerability — and all of this is plainly visible.

However, for a country like Moldova, this long-term crisis and negative trend within the EU cannot be compared to the almost immediate and fatal challenges facing our own country.

We have not yet reached a stage of Eurosnobbery or Euroscepticism. Our problems stem from a different, much deeper “pit”: depopulation; rapidly advancing poverty that consumes everything in its path; social atomization and the breakdown of solidarity; energy isolation; and a parasitic, consumption based economic model. And, most importantly, the growing incompetence and inadequacy of Moldova’s political and ruling class — regardless of this class’s geopolitical orientation. When the key issues of the country’s strategic development are simply ignored, and meaningful discussion is replaced by hollow geopolitical debates, the result is deeper division, disintegration and continued emigration.

This is precisely why, for Moldova, European integration is not about connecting to Europe’s crisis, but about accessing a progressive resource — and, unfortunately, the only such resource — capable of counteracting its own destructive tendencies. It is therefore crucial that European integration be understood as modernisation, grounded in a specific set of values. Particularly relevant for the Republic of Moldova are: a secular and anti-clerical model of development, social justice, solidarity, support for cultural and linguistic diversity, and the fight against discrimination. All of these principles are enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the European Social Charter.

One may debate the extent to which these values are implemented in EU member states — and this is one of the central battlegrounds of political struggle within those societies. But the values themselves are not being questioned.

What Moldova needs is quite modest: to hold on to this still-abundant source of modernisation. And this is not merely a source of cheap capital, but capital that enters the country in a targeted way, in line with clearly defined development objectives. These include increasing the competence of the political class; raising educational and humanitarian standards; improving overall living standards; creating long-term incentives for economic development; overcoming all forms of the restoration of archaic institutions — “godfatherism” and nepotism; modernising energy infrastructure; and building a democratic, sustainable and modern state.

The European Union has already done a great deal to enable Moldova to pursue these objectives in 2025. The progress is, as they say, visible.

To what extent are these goals genuinely shared by the current Moldovan government? For now, this remains unclear. There are too many slogans, too much pro-European occultism in the “Cargo cult” style, too many flags and giant polystyrene cut-out letters spelling “EU,” too much geopolitics and too many oaths of loyalty — and far too little evidence of a willingness on the part of the authorities to be an active, intelligent, critical and creative participant in the modernisation process.

This is where the main risk lies: in the dogmatism and administrative dependency of those in power. Their representatives clearly expect European consultants to do everything for them, while the sole task of the ruling majority is to secure the necessary parliamentary votes.

Being a docile, pro-European regional proxy is the opposite of genuine European integration. It may earn praise and friendly pats on the back from important European figures — but not from those who ultimately decide Moldova’s accession to the European Union.

Inclusive EU accession process

What is the position of the Civil Congress and the Alternative bloc on European integration? Can this process become inclusive and integrate the pro-European opposition? How do the Alternative bloc and the Civil Congress differ from other political forces in their approach to the European age?

European integration is the main element that unites the representatives of the Alternative bloc. However, the differences from other pro-European forces are substantial.

First, for us, the EU is neither synonymous with free social assistance nor a geopolitical idol. For us, the EU is an accessible and easily understandable source — without any real alternative — of economic, social, legal and democratic modernisation for the Republic of Moldova. That is why, in our case, European integration always implies dialogue, the constant intersection of initiatives, the existence of our own sovereign position in the pragmatic choice of modernisation priorities, and the ability to defend this position convincingly.

In other words, most pro-European forces say: we must carry out unpopular reforms in order to secure a bright European future, and once we join the EU, everything will fall into place. Our position is the opposite: we must achieve visible social, economic and legal results on the road to the EU, not after the triumphant date of accession. Development first, accession second. From our perspective, movement toward the EU means precisely long awaited, people-centred reforms, where each step leads to tangible improvements — not sadistic methods of shock therapy imposed on an already weakened and exhausted country.

Second, for us, the EU represents a responsible challenge to our own capacity to respond — including to a fundamental question: why does the Republic of Moldova need the European Union? If we are unable to provide a clear and concise answer to this question, it is unlikely that we can expect a constructive response from the 27 Member States regarding Moldova’s accession. What is our contribution to the future of the Union? To its security and socio-economic stability? What is unique about that contribution?

The third — and most important — aspect is inclusiveness. Yes, this must be an inclusive process involving all political and civil forces, regardless of their orientation — not only those who formally declare themselves pro-European. Placing European integration at the centre of constructive national level debate, in which every critical voice is heard, is a prerequisite for success. Without this, nothing will work.

Unfortunately, until now, the topic of European integration has been a source of envy and an object of monopolisation by the only “correct” political force. It has not been treated as a field of consensus, but as a weapon used to dehumanise opponents and brand them as “enemies of the people”.

I repeat: for a geopolitical proxy, a night watchman on the EU’s eastern borders, such behaviour may be understandable. But for a genuinely ambitious reformist force, it looks caricatural and, ultimately, ridiculous.

Economic liberalisation

How do you assess the way in which the current government is managing the relationship between the reforms required by the EU and the country’s internal socio-economic realities? In your opinion, what is missing for the European integration process to be perceived as a national project?

I believe I have already addressed these questions. I would only add that European Community legislation is not merely a rigid framework, but a fairly flexible one. Much here depends on the national government’s ability to be persuasive and proactive in its dialogue with European partners.

This primarily concerns the possible abandonment of the current repressive economic model and the presentation of a comprehensive and coherent programme of economic liberalisation. Creating incentives for investment, expanding employment, and slowing the outflow of capital from Moldova (primarily from the banking sector) — all of this is about freedoms, not about instructions, excessive regulations, and normative acts.

What is happening now? European directives are being added on top of our existing domestic system of overregulation and prohibition–authorisation. And what will the result be? This pressure will simply suffocate any economic activity in a country that is already in a state of economic coma.

Today, more than ever, we need to return to the experience of the legal “guillotine,” which reduced the number of prohibitions and curtailed the discretionary regulatory powers of officials. We must also abandon the policy of total fiscal “search and seizure.” The priorities of European reforms should be justice, the rule of law, security, civil rights, environmental protection, and social welfare, while the entire business sphere should be liberalised to the maximum — for a fixed period, agreed with our European partners. Such a flexible approach to setting priorities was demonstrated by our colleagues in the Baltic states prior to their accession to the EU. Luxembourg and Ireland, moreover, have retained a liberal approach to taxation and business development even within the European Union.

The controversy of federalisation based on the Kozak model

You are part of a political bloc that supports European integration. In September, during a programme broadcast on TV8, you expressed regret that the Kozak Memorandum was not signed in 2003, when you were an adviser to President Vladimir Voronin. Ultimately, which model of development do you consider appropriate for the Republic of Moldova: the one offered by the European integration project, or federalisation based on the model promoted by Moscow?

There is no reason for intrigue. I have never regretted that the Kozak Memorandum was not signed in 2003. Moreover, unlike other politicians in the government at the time, I entered into an open polemic with Dmitry Kozak in the pages of the Kommersant newspaper in 2005.

And on TV8, I said the following: signing the Memorandum would have been a mistake; not signing it would also have been a mistake. The main mistake at the time was that we, the Moldovan side, conducted the negotiations with the Russian side incorrectly.

As for federalisation, during that programme I stated very clearly that there are currently no grounds for returning to such models — federal ones.

However, there was another admission, and it was not the first time I had made it. I said that on the night when the document was ultimately not signed, I had recommended in writing to the President of Moldova that he sign it. I do not believe that I was right at that moment, and I said so on the same programme. It was simply the truth — a truth that reflects the complexity and drama of the psychological situation at the time.

I first acknowledged this uncomfortable truth publicly in 2021, on the N4 television channel. I did so because, for many years, at the initiative of the Socialists, the main culprit — and by no means a hero — of the failure of the “Kozak Memorandum” was declared to be Mark Tkachuk, portrayed as an “MI6 agent” and a CIA proxy.

The fact that this fragment resurfaced in a completely distorted and scandalised context, amid the heated atmosphere of the election campaign, is entirely to the credit of the ruling party’s political strategists. This is easy to verify by watching the interview in its entirety. Therefore, questions about federalisation should be addressed precisely to these political strategists. They clearly understand federalisation better than I do.

The Transnistrian dilemma

What is the position of the “Civil Congress” and the “Alternative” bloc on the reintegration of the Transnistrian region? Is it possible to advance the European integration process in parallel with the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict? What model of settlement do you consider realistic in the current geopolitical context? In your opinion, is the “5+2” negotiation format on Transnistria still relevant today, given that two of the mediators are at open war? How do you envisage future negotiations on this issue?

The transnistrian region is the cornerstone of both Moldovan statehood and Moldova’s potential integration into the European Union. Without Transnistria, Moldova’s accession to the EU simply will not happen. A second Cyprus scenario is either a utopia or, worse, a sign of incompetence. If Moldova reaches the threshold of EU accession, it will be admitted within its internationally recognised borders — not in fragments or parts. It is difficult to imagine that within these borders there could remain an uncontrolled territory hosting a Russian military presence.

This is the position of the Alternative bloc, clearly and precisely set out in our programme. Now, after the elections, this obvious truth must also be articulated by the Head of the EU Delegation to Moldova, Ms Ivon Piorko, and by the German Ambassador to Moldova, Mr Hubert Knirsch.

The time for a solution has come. Active European policy itself creates a range of new opportunities for resolving this issue — opportunities that did not exist before. Moreover, European integration and the peaceful reintegration of the Republic of Moldova are two paths along the same road; they constitute another constructive challenge of modernisation.

It is important to understand that resolving the Transnistrian issue would significantly reduce multiple risks, including those affecting foreign investment. It would mean a country that effectively defends its borders — and, with them, its internal market and external trade relations. It would mean a country with a higher credit rating, capable of more dynamic economic and social transformation. It would also be a country able to change the profile of its economic specialisation. It is worth recalling that a substantial share of Moldova’s exports to the European Union consists of metal products, textiles and cement produced in the Transnistrian region. Electricity could also be added to this list.

To achieve this strategic objective, we identify three key directions, all based exclusively on soft power, excluding any form of coercion or pressure.

The first concerns the status of Transnistria within the Republic of Moldova. The conceptual basis for such a status is set out in the relevant 2005 law. The second direction is socio-economic and humanitarian reintegration, which we believe should be grounded in a post-conflict development programme for a unified state, agreed with the European Union. The third aspect relates to demilitarisation and security guarantees. Proposals in this area include transforming the peacekeeping operation into a mission of civilian and military observers under an international mandate, and completing the withdrawal of Russian troops and weapons from the territory of Moldova.

In parallel with these efforts, it is essential to build trust between Moldovan citizens on both sides of the Nistru River. In this context, it would be entirely appropriate to recognise the property rights of individuals and legal entities in the Transnistrian region within the legal framework of the Republic of Moldova.

As for the 5+2 format, no diplomatic platform should be dismissed, even if it is currently “frozen” due to the war. Let us be honest: all constructive initiatives — both in terms of European integration and Moldova’s reintegration — are possible only in a context of peace, however fragile. The withdrawal of Russian weapons and the transformation of the peacekeeping mission are likewise impossible without dialogue with Moscow.

Ecology in the spotlight

There is a perception that environmental policy often takes a back seat to urgent political and economic issues. As a member of the parliamentary committee on the environment, what do you intend to do to bring environmental issues back to the forefront of the parliamentary agenda?

It is precisely the inertia of our entire political class — practically without exception. Environmental issues in Moldova remain on the periphery of political debate, even though, given the scale of the threats we face, they should be among the top priorities. Soil desertification, changes in land use and economic profiles driven by climate change, a catastrophic decline in water resources, pollution, the drying up of small rivers and the silting of the Dniester, and hundreds of unmanaged solid waste dumps — all of this constitutes the dramatic reality of our time. Together, these factors lead to a profound deterioration in quality of life and to the rapid degradation of Moldova’s agricultural sector.

In response, we are preparing a series of draft laws. Some are relatively predictable — for example, a Law on River Protection, or amendments to forest legislation that would prohibit destructive and concealed logging practices, such as so-called “sanitary felling.” Incidentally, this is a locally invented corruption mechanism. We are also working on measures to create incentives for farmers to engage in afforestation.

Perhaps the most important strategic decision currently under discussion, however, is a proposal for a new system of economic zoning of agricultural crops in the Republic of Moldova, designed to respond to the challenges of climate change. This initiative is being developed in dialogue with environmental non governmental organisations and representatives of the academic community. Naturally, such ideas and solutions must ultimately be initiated by the state, in close cooperation with the broadest and most representative segments of society.

The “Alternativa” bloc brings together forces with different identities and historical experiences. How do you ensure political and programmatic coherence among these components?

For the moment, we are still far from articulating any serious doctrinal differences. We have far more in common, particularly when it comes to the European reset of our statehood, civic consolidation, social initiatives, and projects in the field of economic liberalisation. It can be said that we have not yet reached the stage at which we would fiercely defend our respective doctrinal particularities.

Thank you!