GEORGIA: puppeteers and сlowns controlled by the Kremlin
From the "success story" of the Eastern Partnership, Georgia, a former Soviet republic in the Caucasus, has significantly regressed over the last decade, sliding towards authoritarianism under Russia’s strong influence. Justice, once reformed and strong, has reached a crossroads of interests, while the press and civil society are rapidly losing freedoms. Russia's influence and interference in Georgia are not new but long-standing, involving hybrid operations, propaganda, military interventions, and two important regions—South Ossetia and Abkhazia—occupied. Disadvantaged geographically and politically due to its vast border with Russia and its distance from the European Union, but with 80 percent of citizens favoring Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgia has failed, in recent parliamentary elections, to free itself from under Russia's boot.
Since 2012, when the Georgian Dream party, supported by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, came to power, Russian propaganda has increasingly infiltrated the Georgian media. After Russia's military intervention in Ukraine, the government in Tbilisi revealed itself to be a Kremlin proxy, obstructing Georgia's integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. During this period, the construction of several strategic projects that would have helped Georgia's development were blocked by Kremlin interests. Political actors in Tbilisi, as well as the clergy, regularly travel to Moscow for instructions, and Russian money has influenced and diverted voters’ choices in the parliamentary elections held this October. The recent elections, held on October 26, which the opposition claims were massively rigged through vote-buying, gave the pro-Russian government in Tbilisi another mandate with a parliamentary majority.
"You go to sleep in Georgia at night and might wake up in the morning in the Russian Federation."
To reach the towns in South Ossetia, located at the demarcation line, beyond which lie Russian troops, you need a special permit that takes two days to obtain from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For this, you must present a copy of your ID, journalist credentials, and a recommendation from a local journalist or media association. After the August 2008 war, Moscow set up a military base less than 40 km from Tbilisi. The demarcation line, which Tbilisi calls the administrative border, while the occupation regime in Ossetia considers it a state border, is constantly shifting, as Russian forces occupy more and more territory. Locals tell us that sometimes they go to bed in Georgia and wake up in the Russian Federation.
As we turn right from the route leading to a few Ossetian villages, we pass a police checkpoint, where we present our permit for access to the region. A police vehicle follows us from a distance of a few hundred meters. "They always do this, which is why people are afraid to speak with journalists," explains Saba Tsisikashvili, a local journalist from the town of Gori who is accompanying me. He also speaks the Ossetian language and is one of the few journalists reporting from these areas.
The villages we pass through look as if time has frozen decades ago: impoverished houses and homesteads, broken roads. You don’t see any children or adults on the streets.
We arrive in the village of Saribari, the last one before the demarcation line. The name of the village means “freedom” in Ossetian.

Tamas and Leila Uduhashvili greet us warmly. They are Georgians, but Ossetian is mostly spoken in the village, which, they say, is similar to Georgian. They show us their property, which is close to the demarcation line, with Russian troops about a kilometer away. Like most villagers, they have no work and receive no wages. There are no investments in the village, nor private businesses. The few jobs available are in government institutions and shops. Everyone has a bit of land around their home, grows something, sells it at the market, and lives that way. Most young people from the village go to work in Russia.
Although poverty is clearly pervasive, Tamas and Leila don’t complain. They have a young hazelnut orchard, which they hope will bring them income in a few years. The fertile land and warm climate are favorable for fruit trees, and they say they aren’t afraid of hard work. Tamas gently avoids talking about what it’s like to live under the watchful eye of the Russians. He is cautious and chooses his words carefully. Sometimes he remains silent, pretending not to have heard the question. He invites us to taste this year’s wine, still fermenting in plastic barrels in a small cellar.
Only in the garden, where he shows us some of this year’s produce, Tamas shares in a half-whisper, leaning close to my ear, that incidents with Russian troops happen every year. Sometimes people disappear, kidnapped by Russian soldiers. There have been cases where Georgians were shot.
"War only brings death, poverty, and shattered lives. We know what war means," Tamas says when we discuss Ukraine, though he avoids sharing his direct opinion.
In his village, opinions about what’s happening in Ukraine are divided. Many side with Russia because they work there, support their families from there, and get most of their information from Russian television, which broadcasts from the occupied territories. And poverty plays a role as well. When people have nothing to put on their children’s plates, politics is the last thing on their minds, says Tamas.
On our way back, we pick up a young man from the road. He tells us that he goes to Russia for construction work several months a year. He says that life is better in Georgia now than during the war and that Georgia wouldn’t make it without Russia.
Gori – Stalin’s birthplace and media taken over by Russian influence
As we reach the main road, we head in the opposite direction from the capital, toward the town of Gori, which is 82 kilometers from Tbilisi. It is known as the birthplace of Iosif Stalin, originally Djugashvili—his family name—the former Russian dictator who ordered the execution of hundreds of thousands of people, including Georgians. Gori, with nearly 50,000 inhabitants, is the closest Georgian city to South Ossetia. The town was bombed by the Russian army during the six-day war in August 2008 and was even occupied by Russian soldiers for several days. Despite this, a large part of the city’s population remains under the influence of Russian propaganda.
We stop by the Stalin Museum, located right in the center of the town. I discuss the state of the media in the region with Saba Tsisikashvili. Local authorities and a substantial part of the local media are increasingly pro-Russian, the journalist tells me. It is challenging to work in independent media in a border region so close to the occupied territories, where incidents are frequent. I ask Saba Tsisikashvili how independent media can survive and continue to provide citizens with accurate information, helping them distinguish between factual reporting and disinformation and propaganda.
"The war in Ukraine has affected everyone. People are under the influence of Russian propaganda, disinformation from Russian and Ossetian channels. They believe that America started the war. And for us, journalists from Gori, it is very difficult to work. There are many opinions, all different, and you have to work within this environment. We don’t have television that favors Georgians, and it's very hard for us. But we think about people’s issues, that they need our help. People are under a lot of pressure. I understand that they live near the border, and it’s very difficult. They are afraid of war. When we talk about the war in Ukraine, they immediately think of the Russo-Georgian war and are horrified by it. The propaganda messages inoculate the idea to Georgians that we could be drawn into a new war. And most people are afraid because they know what war means. This is one of the simplest examples," says the journalist.
In Gori, the few television channels and print publications are funded by the state and advertising, which comes from Georgian businesses in Russia. Independent media is finding it harder to survive and is in the minority. The local executive also creates online platforms, opens websites, and the police favor state media journalists, helping them obtain exclusive news so that they become more popular than independent media. In fact, this is how they try to destroy independent media, says Saba.
We talk in the courtyard of the Stalin Museum, where the dictator is still popular in Gori. Most Georgians are not at all proud of Stalin; quite the opposite. Only the residents of Gori are proud of him.
In this town with a strong Soviet feel, you find Stalin everywhere – in souvenir shops, on shop murals, and until 2011, a massive statue stood in front of the grand city hall. Now the only statue of Stalin is in the museum courtyard, but the main boulevard connecting the central square to the imposing museum is still called Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin Boulevard.
The Kremlin narrative that Georgia started the 2008 war is increasingly promoted by the government in Tbilisi
The narrative from Moscow that Georgia started the August 2008 war—after which Russia occupied South Ossetia and later recognized it—is increasingly promoted by the government in Tbilisi. "Our government, which is from the Georgian Dream party, claims that Georgia started this war. And many people believe this narrative. Many also think that this war was a mistake. But the biggest problem is that the government continues to say that Georgia started the 2008 war, and that is a huge problem. People believe the government is right.
Georgia's mistake was not informing promptly and accurately about that war, while Russia heavily misled international opinion. Ukraine, for example, managed to inform promptly, documenting everything very quickly, including the Russian bombings, and telling the world the reality. Here, it was exactly the opposite. At that time, Russia specifically misled by claiming that the Georgians were bombing Tskhinvali, and there is probably still a belief that the Georgian government made mistakes because timely information was lacking.
The problem is that the government is reluctant to provide detailed information. The government acts like a propagandist and disinformer. Nobody is interested in the details. If people paid attention to the small things, they would probably change their minds. Our leadership says that Ukraine has a bad government, and people repeat the same thing. Not everyone believes this, but a large number of people are still influenced by this narrative," asserts the Georgian journalist.
South Ossetian Refugee and Writer: “We didn’t know who was shooting. Russian TV channels told us the Georgians were firing at us. We didn’t know what to believe.”
Natela Nebieridze, 70 years old, is a refugee from the village of Kekhvi, located eight kilometers from Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. She was forced to flee with her family when the bombings began one August morning. They left behind a beautiful homestead, a two-story house with a stunning garden and orchard. She hasn’t returned since. Her biggest regret is leaving behind a library with hundreds of books, some very old and valuable, collected by her family over the years. “I only took an icon, which I still keep.” The Russians who occupied her village looted the refugees’ homes and then set them on fire, she recalls.

The ordeal she went through, along with others fleeing the violence, is detailed in one of her books. Natela Nebieridze has written several books about the situation of Georgians and Ossetians, who previously lived in peace on these lands. She is now a well-known writer in Georgia. “We spent three days fleeing through mountains, forests, rivers. We didn’t know what was happening. We were told that the Georgian army was shooting. This is what Russian television was broadcasting, and these rumors reached us too. We had no other information,” she says with tears in her eyes. She moved from place to place, staying with friends or people who extended a helping hand, until the government provided her with a small room in Verkhvebi, a village near Tbilisi built especially for Georgian refugees. The conditions are modest, and repairs are always needed. Her husband has passed away, and now she struggles to get by on her own. Her pension is very small, not even enough for medicine. She dries fruits and stocks up in the summer to have provisions for the winter.
The writer follows all that’s happening in Ukraine, reliving the sad moments she endured. “Russian soldiers act with the same brutality as they did in Ossetia. Georgia is increasingly under Russian influence, which is why it is not progressing in development. Where Russia is, you cannot speak of prosperity or freedoms because they don’t exist,” says Natela Nebieridze. “In the occupied territories, the rights of ethnic Georgians who remain are violated, with frequent cases of kidnappings and murders. Meanwhile, Russian propaganda continues to mislead the international community. Unfortunately, in 2008, it somewhat succeeded in this, although after what has happened in Ukraine, Syria, and the world at large, Western leaders have largely changed their perspective on these events.”
“Georgians know what war means and what Russian aggression is. If someone had told me ten years ago that Georgia’s government would come to be so influenced by Russia, openly showing this, I wouldn’t have believed it. I didn’t believe that Georgia could turn back from its natural path, on which it had set out with so much confidence. Many good reforms were made, which were showing results, and now we’ve turned in the opposite direction,” says the writer.
The Border with the Russian Federation
The road leading to the Lars Larsi Border Crossing with Russia is lined with large cargo trucks stretching for miles. Most of the trucks bear Armenian, Turkish, and Georgian license plates, indicating that the international sanctions imposed on Russia for its military aggression against Ukraine seem ineffective here.
At the checkpoint in the Kazbegi Mountains, the temperature is far below the regional average due to the narrow pass between two mountains.
In September 2022, this border crossing was overwhelmed by Russians fleeing the mobilization for war. Lines of Russian-licensed cars stretched for 40 kilometers into Georgia. Now, the crossing is quiet. A woman with a child arrives from Russia seeking medical care in Georgia. She has lived in Vladikavkaz, Russia, for many years. “The medical services in Georgia are high quality, so we come here as we have Georgian citizenship,” she tells me. When I ask her opinion about Russia's war in Ukraine, she quickly leaves without answering. An elderly man awaits his granddaughter from Russia, who will soon start her studies at a university in Tbilisi. He sent three grandsons back to Georgia at the beginning of the aggression in Ukraine, not wanting them to be mobilized. Now, all three work in Georgia, he tells me.
On the Russian side of the border is the Republic of North Ossetia. After the considerable increase in Russian men fleeing to Georgia, Russian authorities in North Ossetia restricted access for cars from other parts of Russia and checked if the men leaving were on mobilization lists. These measures have reduced the number of people crossing into Georgia at this point, according to a Georgian border police officer who wishes to remain anonymous. “I am not allowed to make statements to the press. Talk to my superiors,” he says.
The nearest town to the Russian border in this region is Stepantsminda.
Starting in spring and lasting until the snowfall, the town is full of tourists who come for mountain hikes in Kazbegi and visits to the renowned monasteries in the region. Winter brings harsh living conditions here, and almost no tourists visit once the cold hits, says Tamara, a 24-year-old who returned home after graduating college. She works as a receptionist at a family-run hotel in Stepantsminda.
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the town’s hotels have been filled with people from Russia. As a result, prices for accommodation, real estate, food, and construction materials have tripled. This trend continues, the young woman says. She sympathizes with the young Russians who are forced to flee their country to avoid conscription but reflects sadly on the young people in Ukraine who are losing their lives fighting Russian occupiers. “Georgians have also experienced war and don’t want to see it happen again. The government tells us that if Georgia supports Ukraine, we risk having a war here too, and Georgians are afraid of that.” Few young people return to Stepantsminda after their studies because well-paying jobs are scarce, and life remains challenging.
Russian Propaganda Narratives: The Church at the Forefront of Propagandists
The Georgian Orthodox Church stands as the country’s most influential conservative force—staunchly anti-gay, anti-drug, and apparently ambivalent about the war in Ukraine. The Church often aligns with Georgia’s ruling party, to the point that local media in Georgia have noted, “If you want to hear the ruling party’s perspective, go to church.” Clergy members and pro-Russian politicians, frequently travel to Russia, returning to promote narratives that favor Moscow. Similar dynamics are observed in Moldova, where investigations by journalists from anticoruptie.md and their Georgian counterparts reveal parallels between the propaganda messages of Moldova’s Socialist Party representatives and propagandists in Tbilisi.
On the morning of October 24, 2024, just two days before parliamentary elections in Georgia, officials from the Financial Ministry’s Investigation Service searched the homes of two members of the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab in Tbilisi. One of them, Eto Buziashvili, had just published an analysis detailing numerous ways in which Russia is interfering in the electoral process, a move that, as she highlighted, "could determine Georgia's future."

In her analysis, Eto Buziashvili showed that rhetoric blaming the West intensified in early 2024, as the Georgian Dream party reintroduced and passed a Russian-style
“foreign agents” law, condemned by the EU as “incompatible with EU values and standards.” This law targets Western-funded NGOs and media by labeling them as foreign agents, which, according to many analysts, suppresses civil society and strengthens an anti-Western narrative in Georgia. This anti-Western narrative has been extensively disseminated across various platforms, aiming to manipulate and influence voters.
“Western countries are dragging Georgia into war, but Georgian Dream stands for peace”—this is one of the most frequently promoted anti-European narratives spread by ruling politicians. The ruling party launched this narrative shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, blaming Ukraine and its Western allies for the war. The ruling party framed the West as a “global party of war” allegedly trying to open a “second front” in Georgia in collaboration with Ukraine. In doing so, the ruling party presented voters with a false choice: peace with Russia under Georgian Dream or war brought by the West. This message escalated on September 26 when the party put up banners in Tbilisi contrasting Ukraine’s bombed-out cities with Georgia’s “peaceful” towns.
"The United States is organizing protests on election day to overthrow Georgian Dream" is another narrative heavily promoted during the autumn election campaign. To preemptively delegitimize any protests that might arise in response to perceived election fraud, the ruling party claims that the U.S. is orchestrating election-day demonstrations. By framing any genuine pro-democracy protests as a foreign-backed coup or revolutionary attempt, Georgian Dream aims to discredit these movements and justify potential crackdowns. This tactic mirrors long-standing Russian narratives portraying Western governments as instigators of coups and revolutions—strategies the Kremlin has used to discredit democratic protests worldwide.
"Georgian Dream can strike a deal with Russia to reclaim Georgia's Russian-occupied regions"—another narrative suggesting that it was not Russia but rather the previous pro-Western Georgian government that instigated the 2008 war against Russia. Georgian Dream implies that stronger ties with Moscow could lead to tangible outcomes, such as reintegration of Georgia’s occupied regions, but only if the party wins a landslide in the parliamentary elections. In September, Georgian Dream founder Bidzina Ivanishvili even suggested that Georgians should apologize for starting the 2008 war.
Georgian Dream also appears to have pushed these narratives in more covert ways to mislead Georgian citizens. Eto Buziashvili notes that in early 2023, Meta, Facebook’s parent company, dismantled a network of hundreds of Facebook accounts connected to the Georgian Dream-led government. This wasn’t the first time Meta revealed and deplatformed efforts by the party to deceive voters.
Helen Khoshtaria: “Moldova has advanced on the path to European integration and must stay the course”
Helen Khoshtaria, a Georgian politician and former member of Parliament from the Liberty Movement—European Georgia, was a familiar figure to me. We met again in Tbilisi at the end of last year, shortly before Georgia gained its status as a candidate country for EU integration. We discussed the state of our countries, the necessary reforms, and how Georgia and Moldova can maintain their democratic paths without deviating from their initial reform plans.
"We must learn that democracy can be lost. Just changing a government won’t guarantee a fully democratic future, nor is it enough on its own. In countries like ours, Moldova and Georgia, where democracy and independence have many enemies, we must understand that working for freedom and democracy is a daily task, something we must uphold ourselves; no one from outside will do it for us,” Khoshtaria said. "The most important reforms are those that will structurally ensure democracy, namely anti-corruption efforts and judicial reform, which must serve as robust pillars of democracy. Compromising or making deals with oligarchs is a mistake that will cost us dearly in the long run, as seen in cases like Plahotniuc in Moldova or Ivanishvili in Georgia," she added. "Free elections play a critical role. If free elections work, the chances of power reverting to undemocratic hands are significantly reduced."
A key part of our discussion also addressed how Russian propaganda and disinformation operate in Georgia, particularly since the start of the war in Ukraine, and what steps should be taken on both policy and societal levels to distinguish accurate information from manipulative messaging. She emphasized that Russian propaganda is strategically employed to hinder the full independence and development of post-Soviet states like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. "Propaganda is not just an information war; it is a hybrid war strategy aimed at undermining democracy. Especially in the context of the war in Ukraine, this issue has become serious and must not be ignored. We must evaluate the real risks of propaganda to the state's democracy and approach it systematically," the Georgian politician said.
More in the coming days.
We will talk about how Russian influence stalled the construction of a strategic Black Sea port in Anaklia, on the border with the Russian-occupied Abkhazia, and the struggles of refugees from Abkhazia, who have been unable to return home since fleeing the war in 1993. We will also explore how, in the occupied territories, Russians have repeatedly altered the demarcation line over the last decade, encroaching on an area comparable in size to Georgia’s second-largest city, Kutaisi.
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