Analysis by Natalia Stercul, Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Association (APE), for FES/APE foreign policy newsletter.

24 February will mark four years since the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Is it realistic to expect peace in 2026? Will there be a cessation of hostilities, merely a short-lived truce, or—despite the deadlock in peace negotiations— could agreements be reached that lead to a long-awaited and lasting peace? What will be the main geopolitical developments this year, and how might they affect the Republic of Moldova?

Despite a series of negotiations, there are still no tangible signs of peace, and the war continues. Moreover, against the backdrop of ongoing diplomatic efforts, Russian attacks on Ukrainian territory have intensified, becoming increasingly sophisticated and brutal. These combined assaults include the use of attack drones, kamikaze drones, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles.

Air raid sirens are now sounding almost continuously in many regions of Ukraine. Although a significant share of the country’s energy infrastructure has already been destroyed, the Russian Federation has stepped up targeted air strikes on thermal power plants, energy facilities, and heating systems across Ukraine during the winter period. These attacks have caused widespread electricity and heating outages, as well as disruptions to water supplies. As a result, millions of Ukrainian civilians are facing extremely harsh living conditions during the winter.

Peace negotiations with US mediation

Although, since returning to the White House, U.S. President Donald Trump has been quite active in promoting his role as a mediator in the negotiation process, his promise to end the war has, for now, remained unfulfilled. The nature of the diplomatic talks on Ukraine increasingly resembles “business consultations”—a pragmatic, deal-oriented approach—rather than a diplomatic process backed by political pressure that could, in one form or another, satisfy all parties and lead to peace.

Even within this framework, the central question remains whether the Russian Federation is prepared to make any concessions on territorial issues. Moscow’s position on security guarantees for Kyiv also remains unclear, particularly regarding the possible presence of Western military forces on Ukrainian territory. In addition, the lack of clarity surrounding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, currently under Russian occupation, raises further concerns. While the agenda is broad and complex, there is, at present, no indication of real political pressure being exerted to force Russia to accept a ceasefire.

At the same time, following new rounds of negotiations in Berlin and Florida, it appeared that Kyiv and Washington were moving closer to a possible compromise on a peace agreement. The World Economic Forum in Davos, where the Ukrainian issue was also expected to feature prominently, was anticipated to yield a framework that would limit Russia’s ability to continue avoiding a settlement under U.S.-proposed conditions.

However, the Ukrainian and American delegations ultimately focused once again on discussions related to Ukraine’s reconstruction and security guarantees, concentrating on practical implementation mechanisms. The closed-door meeting between President Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky in Davos did not result in any concrete agreement.

The situation on the front line

The Russian Armed Forces continue their offensive operations. Although they have been unable to achieve rapid breakthroughs, Russia has retained the initiative and has not halted its advance along the front line. This allows Moscow to exert sustained, exhausting pressure and, albeit slowly, to push deeper into Ukraine’s territory. At the same time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to use all available means to repel Russian attacks along the front.

The Kremlin views 2026 as a key year for achieving its maximalist objectives in the war against Ukraine. Military experts argue that it is precisely this inertia—rather than the speed of territorial advances—that will shape the character of hostilities in 2026. Russia’s priorities during this period are expected to include the full occupation of the Donetsk Oblast and Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Analysts do not rule out diversionary actions across multiple sectors of the front.

Large-scale warfare is unlikely to come to an end and will continue to be marked by limited territorial gains, high military casualties, missile strikes, and drone attacks across Ukraine. Both sides face significant vulnerabilities, including shortages of personnel, constraints on weapons supplies, economic pressures, and other structural challenges. Nevertheless, both Russia and Ukraine consider their fundamental interests to be at stake and show no intention of compromising on them.

Moreover, the intensification of fighting, the expansion of Russian offensive forces, increased production of offensive weapons, missiles, and drones, as well as growing external support for Russia from Iran, China, and North Korea, all point to the continuation of the war into 2026.

Republic of Moldova: Security Risks, Reintegration Plans, and EU Accession

The Republic of Moldova continues to feel the full range of destructive consequences of the war in neighbouring Ukraine. Countering security risks and threats remains a priority on both the national and regional agenda. The fall of drones and repeated violations of Moldova’s airspace during Russia’s large-scale attacks on Ukraine increasingly endanger the country’s citizens and require a response from defence structures. The need to strengthen national defence capabilities more actively, including the development of systems for detecting and neutralising drones, is becoming increasingly evident. However, existing capabilities in this area remain very limited.

Accession to the European Union is a key foreign policy priority for the Republic of Moldova, and over the past year the country has made notable progress along its European path. At the same time, the transnistrian conflict remains one of the serious obstacles to Moldova’s EU accession. While this issue is rarely discussed openly, in expert circles various potential and hypothetical settlement scenarios continue to be analysed.

Against the backdrop of increasingly strained relations between the United States and the European Union, it is becoming clear that European states may reassess some of their previous approaches, including the level and modalities of support for countries pursuing European integration. These new realities are likely to encourage more cautious attitudes toward states with unresolved conflicts. For the Republic of Moldova, this context entails additional risks.

The key factor shaping the Transnistrian issue remains the evolution of the military confrontation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as well as the final outcome of the war. Consequently, prospects for a Transnistrian settlement depend to a significant extent on Kyiv’s position, Ukraine’s available resources and capabilities, and the pace and outcome of the fighting.

Chișinău’s official position is clearly oriented toward ending the war as soon as possible, eliminating the Russian military presence from the Transnistrian region, pursuing parallel accession to the European Union together with Ukraine, and completing the EU accession process. However, if the conflict is prolonged and Russian forces advance closer to Moldova’s borders, security risks will inevitably increase. Under these circumstances, the trajectory of the Transnistrian settlement will largely depend on developments on the front line. In the absence of major changes, it is highly likely that the situation will remain largely unchanged in 2026.

At present, the reintegration process shows virtually no tangible progress. The Transnistrian region is experiencing economic instability and remains under a state of emergency, repeatedly extended due to persistent energy supply difficulties, dysfunctions in the industrial sector, and a sharp decline in budget revenues. Many experts anticipated that this period of crisis could serve as a turning point for reintegration, but this has not materialised. The reasons lie not only in the reluctance of Tiraspol, but also in Chișinău’s limited preparedness to act decisively.

Against this difficult economic backdrop, Transnistria is preparing for elections of the region’s leader, scheduled for December 2026. While it remains unclear how political forces in Tiraspol will realign or which candidates will emerge, it is evident that Moscow’s position will be decisive. The Kremlin is reassessing its relations with the Republic of Moldova in general and with the Transnistrian region in particular, and official rhetoric suggests that the outcome of this reassessment is unlikely to be favourable for Chișinău.

Statements by the Chișinău authorities regarding a possible union with Romania are unlikely to be received positively in the Transnistrian region and could further distance prospects for reintegration in the short term. At the same time, in a negative scenario marked by the end of the war in Ukraine on unfavourable terms and a potential Russian advance toward Moldova’s borders, unification with Romania and accelerated EU accession could emerge as viable options for Chișinău in support of its foreign policy and European integration objectives.

In conclusion, geopolitical turbulence is set to persist, driven by the prolonged war in Ukraine, the difficulties surrounding ceasefire negotiations, and the complex situation on the battlefield. In this context, no major progress is expected in resolving the Transnistrian conflict, and reintegration efforts are unlikely to gain concrete momentum. The primary focus of the Chișinău authorities will therefore remain on advancing domestic reforms necessary to sustain and deepen the European integration agenda.