Editorial by Mădălin Necșuțu, journalist at TVR Moldova and Balkan Insight, for FES/APE foreign policy newsletter.

Even though we have seemingly entered a year that should be more politically stable, the Republic of Moldova will continue to face a number of major risks and challenges, both internally and externally. Let us take them one by one. With the inauguration of Alexandru Munteanu’s government at the end of last year, it became clear that Moldova’s priorities had shifted. The main focus is now on economic growth, which is intended to generate greater prosperity.

Projected economic growth of around 3% annually in 2026 is unlikely to lead to a substantial improvement in citizens’ living standards. Nevertheless, it does represent progress. The authorities will have to address two major issues: how and in which sectors the €1.9 billion in European funds will be invested in order to generate sustainable economic growth, and how foreign investors can be attracted to the Republic of Moldova.

With regard to the second issue, there are serious shortcomings, including labour shortages, the proximity of a war that may be prolonged or end with uncertain outcomes, and deficiencies in consolidating the rule of law along the lines of Western democracies—an inherently complex process that requires time. Under these conditions, it is difficult to expect a significant influx of foreign investment into Moldova.

However, the Republic of Moldova can accelerate infrastructure projects with Romania, its main trading partner, in order to deepen economic ties and facilitate the transport of goods to European markets.

At the same time, Chișinău faces an acute need to modernise its domestic infrastructure, both to improve the movement of people and goods and to enable Moldova to participate—alongside Romania—in the reconstruction process in Ukraine. From an economic perspective, the challenges of 2026 will therefore be significant and, to a large extent, difficult to predict.

Among Chișinău’s strengths are the experience of Prime Minister Alexandru Munteanu and his team in the fields of economics and finance, as well as their background in the business environment—assets that could prove to be a clear advantage.

The Transnistrian issue, a time bomb

The current pro-European government has developed a reflex of avoiding open discussions about plans to reintegrate the separatist region of Transnistria. At times, the issue appears to be treated as taboo, with the Presidency, the Government, and Parliament reluctant to address it openly. It is as if the authorities are trying to “sweep the dirt under the carpet,” hoping that by not naming uncomfortable realities, they will either not materialise or simply fade away. This ostrich-like tactic of burying one’s head in the sand helps no one.

The continued existence of this region under a pro Russian separatist regime in Tiraspol can today be explained by two main factors: its indirect perpetuation by Chișinău through economic incentives linked to access to the European market, and the long-standing scheme of free gas supplied by the Russian Federation. Ultimately, however, both of these levers remain within Chișinău’s control.

Naturally, an abrupt economic short-circuiting of the Transnistrian region would automatically trigger a major humanitarian crisis—one that Chișinău, already grappling with its own difficulties, would struggle to manage. At the same time, such a scenario would rapidly and forcibly integrate a significant number of voters who are by no means predominantly pro European.

This is why the issue must be understood as both a potential social and humanitarian crisis and a serious political challenge. A transition period in the reintegration process is clearly necessary. However, this does not mean that the subject should be excluded from open public debate.

On the contrary, an honest discussion could increase pressure on the Tiraspol regime to accept certain concessions aimed at the partial democratisation of the region—even before a possible scenario of implosion. Such an implosion would stem from the region’s growing dependence on an increasingly fragile supply of Russian gas, a mechanism that has become ever more uncertain and can be interrupted at any moment—not only by Chișinău, but also by its European partners.

In this context, an open debate is urgently needed on the real requirements of reintegrating the Transnistrian region, including the identification of concrete solutions together with Moldova’s Western development partners. These partners are, in fact, the only actors capable of mitigating the financial shock that such a process could entail.

To this end, an international donors’ platform already exists, created by Romania, France, and Germany. This mechanism has been used in the past to provide essential financial support—without which the Republic of Moldova would have risked collapse in the face of the pandemic, energy crises, or the economic impact of the war in Ukraine..

Gagauzia, an important milestone for Chișinău

Closely linked to the Transnistrian issue is the need to improve the situation in Gagauzia, a region that has been subjected for decades to Russification through propaganda and Moscow’s cultivated hostility toward the centre. The Gagauz population has been conditioned to perceive Chișinău as an adversary. At present, however, there is a window of opportunity: the political machine associated with Ilan Șor has reduced its activity until the next national elections, and pro European forces should step in through sustained and courageous grassroots political engagement to explain more clearly what accession to the European Union actually means.

For the time being, however, no such trend is evident. This year, despite the suspension of elections to the People’s Assembly in Comrat in March, elections could still be held at a later stage, possibly followed by elections for the governor (Bashkan) of the Gagauz region. For precisely this reason, the time has come for pro-European forces—particularly the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS)—to launch very active local electoral campaigns.

As a result, 2026 will be a decisive year for the evolution of political life in Gagauzia and for the relationship between Chișinău and Comrat.

Reforms, and More Reforms

In 2026, the Republic of Moldova will need a well structured reform plan. This ranges from justice reform and the vetting process—which has been dragging on longer than necessary—to administrative-territorial reform, which finally appears to be on the agenda of the current government. This reform represents an important step ahead of the 2027 local elections and could help transform Moldova into a more streamlined state, with fewer municipalities, the abolition of Soviet inspired districts, and a decentralised system aimed at creating development regions capable of accessing European funds through locally developed projects.

Continued efforts and sustained political will are therefore required to reform the existing legal and administrative framework.

At the same time, the Republic of Moldova must continue its cooperation with European Union Member States that have relevant experience, as is already the case with joint infrastructure projects implemented together with Romania and financed through European funds. The authorities in Chișinău need to gain hands on experience and learn—starting now—how to design competitive projects and access EU funding allocated through open competition.

Last but not least, the Republic of Moldova must reform and professionalise its armed forces in line with modern standards and equip them adequately, in a context marked by increasingly real security threats and a war in its immediate vicinity. Even if this does not imply accession to NATO—a sensitive topic with limited public support, shaped in part by sustained propaganda from the Russian Federation—defence needs and related investments must be understood as a necessity, not a matter of choice.

As a result, 2026 is shaping up to be a challenging and difficult year to manage, given the fatigue accumulated in recent years and the many uncertainties surrounding the future. Despite these constraints, the Republic of Moldova must keep its reform momentum at full speed and undertake these demanding changes—first and foremost for its own development, and secondly for Brussels. European integration ultimately means embracing the democratic values and principles that have underpinned Europe’s peace and prosperity since the Second World War.