Former Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Alexandru Flenchea gave an interview to the FES/APE Foreign Policy Newsletter, in which we discussed the priorities of the Transnistrian region’s reintegration process in the context of Moldova’s European integration. We addressed the political, economic, and human dimensions of this process, as well as the issue of the region’s captivity to the interests of local oligarchs and Moscow.

Mr. Flenchea, while there is intense discussion about EU accession, very little is said about European integration with or without the Transnistrian region. How important is it to bring this topic to the forefront of the accession debate?

There is not enough discussion because, frankly, this is not a matter for debate but an unavoidable reality. If we analyse the current context and what is likely to happen in the next three to five years, I do not believe we will achieve unanimity within the EU for the accession of a country that still hosts Russian troops on its territory.

The Republic of Moldova currently has Russian troops on its soil, so we have no alternative. If we want European integration in the near future, the state has an obligation to resolve the conflict and restore the rights of all its citizens — on both sides of the Nistru River.

Plans drawn up

How do you view the fact that, at present, the Moldovan authorities do not have a well-defined contingency plan for the eventuality that the separatist regime in Tiraspol might suddenly collapse — even as soon as tomorrow?

I believe that the Republic of Moldova needs not a contingency plan, but a detailed action plan to restore its territorial integrity. We must not stand by and wait for the regime to collapse; we must take active steps to bring the Transnistrian region back into the Republic of Moldova — not only de jure, but also de facto.

There are already projects and plans that have been developed in recent years, and the authorities are analysing them in order to formulate a new, coherent action plan. It remains to be seen how prepared the new government is to act decisively and swiftly.

Market liberalisation on the left bank of the Nistru

How great is the risk that Russia will trigger an energy crisis in the region by cutting off gas supplies? Could Russia quickly create a major humanitarian crisis for Moldova if it decided to stop sending Russian gas to the region?

As long as the region — and, by extension, the Republic of Moldova — depends on Russian gas, the risks will persist. One of the government’s priorities must be to address the problems in the region’s energy sector. Just as the gas market has been liberalised on the right bank, the same must be done on the left bank: through legal and transparent contracts, fair procurement, and real market prices.

Once this happens, the economic reintegration of the two banks will, to a large extent, follow naturally.

Oligarchic and Moscow interests in Tiraspol

Why does the Tiraspol regime not access the €60 million in European energy assistance? What would it mean if Tiraspol decided to do so, and under what circumstances could such financial aid be accessed — or denied?

First, we need to define our terms. Who is Tiraspol, actually? We must understand very clearly that there is no real government in Tiraspol — no authorities that are legitimate, legal, or even representative. The administrative structures managing the region on a daily basis actually represent the interests of the Sheriff company, that is, the local oligarchs, rather than those of ordinary citizens.

The oligarchs in Tiraspol have maintained and developed this secessionist project with the constant support of the Russian Federation for one clear reason: to make enormous profits. And we are talking about very substantial sums of money here — sums that, as we all know, are far from negligible.

These profits are possible only as long as the region’s entire economy depends on free gas supplied by Russia — gas that has been delivered consistently over the years and has become the foundation of the local oligarchs’ prosperity.

Therefore, the assistance proposed by the European Union, along with the legal arrangements and contracts that the previous government attempted to advance to Tiraspol — in my opinion, too timidly — hold no interest for this regime. Their acceptance of such support would entail legality, transparency, and compliance with the rules of a market economy, which would inevitably mean the end of the economic model on which the current secessionist project known as Transnistria is based. Obviously, that is not in the interest of those in power there.

In conclusion, what I want to emphasize is that we cannot and must not rely on the good faith or sense of responsibility of those who effectively control the region. The Government and authorities of the Republic of Moldova bear full responsibility and must intervene to restore order and legality in this territory.

Calculations and perspectives

Would it be necessary to establish, starting now, a special fund for the reintegration of the Transnistrian region, in partnership with the Republic of Moldova’s Western partners? Experts have estimated that the costs of reintegrating the two banks of the Nistru River would amount to approximately EUR 500 million per year, at least during the initial years of the process.

There are different calculations regarding the costs of the reintegration process. However, one thing is certain and must be clearly understood: the reintegration of the Transnistrian region is not an act of adoption. It does not mean that every citizen on the right bank of the Nistru should “adopt” a Transnistrian and cover their daily expenses.

Such a model of reintegration would simply not work. Reintegration is not a subscription we pay for monthly or annually just to keep the country united.

It is no coincidence that I spoke about reintegration. This principle is also reflected in the Government’s programme of activity, which places emphasis on the economic dimension of reintegration. Just as the economy functions on the right bank — where companies operate, cooperate, and pay taxes — the same must happen on the left bank.

Therefore, to the extent that the Republic of Moldova is economically sustainable, the Transnistrian region — as an integral part of the country — will also be sustainable. If the Republic of Moldova manages to function without external assistance, then the reintegrated region will be able to do the same. Conversely, if the country depends on external support, so will the region.

Yes, we are aware of the current economic situation in the Republic of Moldova and of its macroeconomic indicators, which are indeed more modest than we would like. However, progress depends on time, effort, reforms, and deliberate, consistent action that can gradually lead to improved results.

The Republic of Moldova needs support and assistance, but this support must target the country as a whole, not just the reintegration project. Of course, throughout this process we will need various. forms of assistance — diplomatic, technical, and financial — but the approach must be integrated, aimed at the overall development of the state.

My appeal is that, when we discuss and negotiate the parameters of assistance with our partners, we do so with the entire Republic of Moldova and the needs of all its citizens in mind, not just those related to the reintegration project. If we fail to act and continue to wait passively for the separatist regime in Tiraspol to collapse on its own, reintegration will not happen. And, in the purely theoretical event that it does happen spontaneously, the costs of reintegration could be even higher than currently estimated.

Captivity in a dictatorial regime

Could Chisinau’s strategy of presenting to the citizens on the left bank of the Nistru a superior model of development — one based on cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union — prove effective? Could a higher standard of living on the right bank attract the residents of Transnistria?

That stage has already been passed. The Republic of Moldova has demonstrated that it is attractive enough for its own citizens living on the left bank of the Nistru. Of course, this is an important condition for a harmonious reintegration, but by itself it is absolutely insufficient.

No matter how much the residents of Transnistria may wish for it — and I can assure you that they do want this conflict to be resolved eventually — they know and understand that they are citizens of the Republic of Moldova. They hold Moldovan identity cards and passports and benefit from public, medical, and educational services provided on the right bank of the Nistru.

The citizens of the Transnistrian region also wish to be part of the European Union, just like most citizens on the right bank. But has this, in itself, led to the resolution of the conflict? No. Because on the left bank of the Nistru there exists a police-type regime that deliberately ensures that the will of the citizens does not matter. What matters there is only the will of the local oligarchs and of Moscow, which continued to control the region and maintain the political and economic captivity of its population.

How do you think Ukraine will continue to respond to the security threat posed by this region, given that it is illegally hosting Russian troops on its territory?

Just as Ukraine, as an independent and sovereign state — whose sovereignty and territorial integrity we fully respect — defines its own policies, so too must the Republic of Moldova, as a sovereign and independent state, act in the same way.

Just as Ukraine identifies threats to its national security and develops policies to ensure its defence and sovereignty, so must the Republic of Moldova.

From the perspective of Moldovan taxpayers, the presence of the Russian army on the left bank of the Nistru is, first and foremost, a direct threat to the Republic of Moldova — and only then to Ukraine. We must act in accordance with our own national interests and priorities. I cannot imagine a situation — at least not in Europe — where a state would define its security and foreign policy based on criteria other than the interests of its own citizens. Of course, it is natural to discuss and coordinate these issues with our partners, especially our immediate neighbours, and, where there are synergies and shared objectives, to act together. Where differences arise, they must be addressed openly and resolved through dialogue. But we must never act to the detriment of our own interests or neglect them in favour of those of others.

I say this not to offend Ukraine, but to emphasize a fundamental principle: everyone — from citizens to state authorities — must think and act in accordance with the national interests of the Republic of Moldova.

Thank you!