Balázs Jarábik, an award winning analyst and decorated diplomat with two decades of experience gave an interview to the Foreign Policy Bulletin in which we discussed in detail the situation of the Transnistrian file. We addressed the current state of this dossier, in which two actors involved in the mediation process are in open military conflict, and how this sensitive issue can be approached pragmatically. We also discussed the parallel processes currently underway: the country’s reintegration and EU accession.

How has Russia’s war against Ukraine reshaped the strategic relevance of the Transnistrian conflict? To what extent is the region’s future determined by the outcome of the war, and to what extent by Chișinău’s internal political capacity and strategy?

Russia’s war has simultaneously reduced Transnistria’s strategic depth and increased its strategic sensitivity. The conflict disrupted key logistics and rendered Russia’s role as mediator politically untenable, while Ukraine’s security considerations now define the outer boundaries of any realistic settlement. The region’s future remains heavily conditioned by the trajectory of the war, as Russian military presence and leverage are the core structural constraints.

At the same time, Chișinău’s strengthened geopolitical orientation has narrowed its strategic options: in the context created by the war, EU integration is viewed as the only viable exit from the current “dead end”. This places greater weight on Moldova’s internal capacity and strategic coherence. The PAS government is therefore pursuing incremental extension of regulatory and economic jurisdiction—using energy policy and customs instruments to deepen practical convergence— while deliberately avoiding premature political settlement.

A Cautious Approach

How would you assess the current level of political will and strategic coherence in Chișinău regarding reintegration? Do you see evidence of a structured long-term strategy, or rather reactive crisis management?

Chișinău’s political will is strong but primarily security-driven, which makes it cautious in execution. The government’s core objective is to prevent Russia from retaining a “backdoor” influence—Transnistria is explicitly viewed in this light—while keeping EU accession on track by separating accession from reintegration. What is taking shape is not a classical, deadline-based reintegration roadmap but a gradual convergence strategy: legal and economic alignment, sectoral working contacts, and instruments such as a proposed convergence fund.

The main weakness lies in coherence beyond the security frame. Capacity constraints and uneven inter-ministerial ownership at times make the policy appear reactive rather than structured, even when the direction is deliberate. At the same time, the PAS leadership operates with a sense of political validation, having won elections despite energy shocks and sustained Russian interference— an outcome that reinforces confidence in its strategic approach.

Vulnerabilities and Risks

What are the principal political, institutional, and security risks associated with reintegrating a territory that has functioned for over three decades under a Moscow-supported separatist regime?

The principal risks relate to the integration of coercive structures, the economic and political costs of reintegration, and the danger of institutional capture. Transnistria’s security apparatus and Moscow-linked networks would be the most difficult to absorb; without careful transformation or dismantling, they could embed long-term vulnerabilities within the Moldovan state.

Politically, reintegration could introduce a substantial electorate shaped by decades of separatist narratives, Russian media influence, and patronage systems—potentially altering national political balances. Institutionally, a rapid political deal without phased legal harmonization and properly vetted cadres could weaken state coherence rather than strengthen it. Additional security concerns include residual Russian leverage, the Cobasna ammunition depot, and the strategic energy nexus around the Kuchurgan power plant.

Greater International Exposure

Is it necessary for the Republic of Moldova to increasingly vocally discuss this Transnistrian file, especially in the context of the tripartite negotiations between the USA, Ukraine and Russia in the United Arab Emirates? Do you think it is necessary for Chisinau to be more vocal on the Transnistrian file at the international level?

There are arguments for raising the international visibility of the Transnistrian file, particularly as current conditions – especially that the economic model is no longer viable following the 2025 energy crisis - create openings for reintegration. However, the government’s instinct is to avoid politicizing the issue in ways that could reopen space for Russia to reassert a “legitimate” mediator role. In a context dominated by Ukraine-focused negotiations, Chișinău favors disciplined and targeted messaging: prioritizing security concerns such as troop withdrawal and Cobasna, while advancing practical convergence based on EU standards and principles.

Chisinau’s objective seems to keep Transnistria on the international agenda— in terms of regulatory alignment and the newly established mechanisms for applying EU standards—without allowing the issue to become a bargaining chip within broader geopolitical negotiations.

There is a lot of talk about changing the 5+2 negotiation format, which is no longer functional today due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Would there be a need for another international format for discussions on the Transnistrian file, or should the discussion be moved “in a package” with the large-scale negotiation for peace in Ukraine?

The 5+2 format is structurally frozen, but it remains, in principle, the only internationally recognized framework that includes all relevant actors. In reality, no durable arrangement on Transnistria—much like broader European security—can be achieved without Moscow’s participation. At the same time, a direct “package” linkage to Ukraine peace negotiations carries risks for Moldova, particularly if it results in Russia reclaiming a formalized role on Moldovan territory under unfavorable conditions.

In the near term, from Chișinău’s perspective, the most workable approach is pragmatic: maintain the 1+1 channel and technical working contacts, deepen EU-supported convergence, and use specific security-related entry points—such as Cobasna, demilitarization measures, and energy transparency—for calibrated external engagement. From a Moldovan and European viewpoint, any future format should be anchored in European norms and credible security guarantees. However, the current U.S. approach—prioritizing direct engagement with Russia in the broader regional context—may ultimately reshape the environment in which the 5+2 format could be reactivated.

Reintegration — A Long-Term Process

Is the reintegration of Transnistria an achievable political objective or rather a long-term technical process? Do you think there is a risk that reintegration, in its current form, will weaken the Republic of Moldova from within?

Reintegration is more realistically a long-term technical and institutional process than a near term political event. A political settlement without deep preparatory convergence—legal alignment, fiscal integration, vetted institutions, and security sector transformation—would be fragile and could weaken Moldova internally, even though there is currently no realistic risk of renewed military conflict between the two banks. The risk lies not in reintegration per se, but in poorly sequenced reintegration that imports opaque networks and coercive structures into the Moldovan state. From a security standpoint, the government’s gradualist approach is therefore rational, but it will require stronger administrative capacity, clearer staging, and sustained political discipline to prevent drift or institutional overstretch. At the same time, a growing humanitarian dimension—driven by the energy shock and deepening economic crisis on the left bank—deserves greater attention in Chișinău, both as a moral responsibility and as a strategic opportunity for confidence-building.

How does the unresolved Transnistrian conflict interact with Moldova’s EU accession trajectory? In this context, is the frequently invoked “Cyprus scenario” a meaningful precedent, or is Moldova’s geopolitical position too different for such a model to be viable?

This is the Achilles’ heel of the government’s approach: it assumes that EU accession can be insulated from the unresolved status of the left bank, yet Brussels is unlikely to accept a durable separation. While the EU provided strong political and financial backing to the PAS government, the post-2025 context is shifting toward firmer conditionality and “homework.” Increasingly, EU officials emphasize that accession planning concerns “one Moldova,” including the left bank.

The frequently cited “Cyprus scenario” is therefore a weak analogy. Moldova’s security environment is more exposed, Russian troops remain on its territory, and the degree of economic interdependence is significantly different—over 80% of Transnistrian exports already reach the EU via the right bank. Chișinău understands replicating another Cyprus is politically unrealistic, particularly from the perspective of EU member states. As a result, government officials increasingly speak about post-accession protocols and structured convergence mechanisms, rather than assuming that a Cyprus-style accession model is viable.

Thank you!