Anti-corruption expert Cristina Ciubotaru gave an interview for the FES/APE foreign policy newsletter, in which we summarised both the progress made and the shortcomings in the field of justice in 2025. We discussed the vetting process in its entirety, the latest EU report on the Republic of Moldova in the area of justice, as well as major corruption cases and their resolution. We invite you to read the interview below.

How do you assess the vetting process so far, and what positive and negative aspects have you observed?

Overall, my assessment is critical. Vetting has produced some results, but the way it was designed and implemented has led to inequalities, inconsistencies, and negative effects on the functioning of the justice system.

One positive aspect is that the announcement of the vetting process prompted some judges and prosecutors to leave the system. It is very likely that some of those who refused to be assessed had real integrity issues, and their departure was necessary. From this perspective, the vetting process had a filtering effect.

However, the major problems relate to the process itself. Vetting was not applied uniformly: all Supreme Court judges were assessed, while at the Prosecutor General’s Office only prosecutors in leadership positions were assessed; all prosecutors in specialised prosecutor’s offices passed the assessment, but judges in specialised anti-corruption panels did not. This selective approach created obvious inequalities between magistrates in similar situations.

Another inequality resulted from the optional nature of vetting. Those who refused the assessment left “honourably,” retaining their pensions and allowances, while some magistrates who accepted the assessment and failed — even though they had fewer problems — lost everything. In this sense, vetting ended up encouraging opportunistic behaviour and penalising accountability.

There are also serious problems related to the consistency of the decisions taken during the extraordinary assessment. Independent analyses, as well as recent statements by the Superior Council of Magistracy, confirm the existence of double standards in the vetting commission’s reasoning, which has led to numerous reassessments.

One extremely serious effect of vetting concerns the temporary transfers of judges. Following mass resignations from the Supreme Court of Justice and the courts of appeal, these courts are facing a chronic shortage of magistrates. To cover these staff shortages, judges from lower courts are being temporarily transferred to higher courts. These transfers raise serious questions about judicial independence, as the judges’ temporary mandates depend on administrative decisions rather than permanent appointments. It is no coincidence that there are already cases pending before the ECHR alleging the lack of a legally established tribunal and independent judges.

In addition, these transfers create major bottlenecks in the examination of cases. Transferred judges abandon cases in the lower courts, which are redistributed to their remaining colleagues. When they return, the cases they leave behind in the higher courts are redistributed in turn. As a result, many cases end up being restarted from scratch, sometimes nullifying three to five years of judicial effort at the lower-court level, while other cases are not examined for two to three years in the courts of appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice.

Persistent criticism from both society and the political sphere, generated by justice reform and the vetting process, is making legal professions increasingly unattractive. In this context, the National Institute of Justice is facing a reduced number of candidates wishing to become judges and prosecutors, which significantly complicates efforts to recruit a sufficient and competitive number of professionals for the justice sector.

Finally, the results of the vetting process are predominantly quantitative rather than qualitative.

The reform is appreciated by development partners mainly in terms of the number of people who have passed through this filter, but not necessarily in terms of the quality and consistency of the assessments.

Despite the vetting process, public confidence in the justice system has steadily declined, reaching only 5-12% according to the IMAS survey of December 2025, and the perception of political control over the judiciary has worsened, from 60% in 2021 to 69% in 2024 (IMAS survey of July 2024). At the same time, the daily functioning of the courts has been seriously affected, while citizens’ right to a fair trial within a reasonable time has been called into question.

Progress, but also shortcomings

The EU Enlargement Report 2025, published by the European Commission on 4 November, highlights positive results in areas under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. How do you assess this report with regard to the Republic of Moldova?

As the report shows, the European Union notes “good progress” by the Republic of Moldova in judicial reform, especially from a quantitative perspective. It mentions the continuation of vetting and the fact that, as a result, several appointments have been made to the specialised bodies of the Superior Council of Prosecutors and the Superior Council of Magistrates, as well as to the Supreme Court of Justice. In other words, the EU is not satisfied with the concrete results of the work of judges, prosecutors, or their self-governing bodies, but rather with the fact that the personnel vacuum created by the reforms is gradually being filled.

In order to be convinced of the real effectiveness of these reforms, the EU explicitly calls on the Republic of Moldova to “ensure sufficient resources for these bodies” and to make “additional efforts to reduce the length of proceedings in all areas and to improve the low rates of case resolution, particularly in criminal matters”. These statements indicate that structural problems in the functioning of the justice system persist, despite the progress reported.

At the same time, the EU clearly notes the lack of a viable approach to recruiting new staff in the justice sector and expressly recommends “developing human resources strategies for the judiciary and prosecution services, including comprehensive salary reform”. This confirms that the reforms have focused more on purging than on sustainable reconstruction.

My conclusion is that the EU is offering moderate praise for the justice reform in a diplomatic manner, elegantly avoiding uncomfortable situations in which it would have to explain its position on the recurring scandals in the justice system that have emerged either as a result of the reforms or in spite of them.

When it comes to the fight against corruption, the European Commission’s tone is even more reserved, mentioning only “some progress”. Although the report refers to the initiative to liquidate the two specialised prosecutor’s offices and the intention to create a specialised prosecutor’s office with joint powers, the EU does not expressly recommend this solution. On the contrary, the emphasis is placed on the need to “continue proactive and effective anti-corruption investigations, leading to a positive track record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments at all levels”, as well as on strengthening the independence, integrity, and operational capacity of the prosecution services.

Furthermore, the nature of the recommendations on “intensifying cooperation between the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and the National Anti-Corruption Centre” suggests that the European Union did not appreciate the effects of the institutional decoupling between these two structures. If we recall the saga surrounding headquarters, budget, and human resources — repeatedly evoked in recent years by the former head of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office — it becomes clear why, not coincidentally, the European Commission further encourages “constant monitoring of the capacity of institutions involved in anti-corruption processes to exercise their powers, ensuring the necessary resources for their functioning”.

The EU has not overlooked the inequality between anti-corruption judges and prosecutors mentioned above, expressly recommending “amending the legislation to introduce mandatory vetting of all judges in specialised anti-corruption panels, including those in the first instance, by the relevant vetting commission”.

Therefore, the EU uses positive diplomatic assessments with a quantitative focus, while real criticism is camouflaged in technical recommendations aimed at generating quality and sustainability in the justice and anti-corruption systems.

However, a truly reformed justice system should already have delivered concrete results in the fight against corruption through effective criminal investigations and high-profile convictions. This is precisely what is not happening. The quantity of those who have passed the vetting process does not guarantee the quality of their work, and the European Commission’s report implicitly reflects this discrepancy.

Complications in major corruption cases

How do you assess the progress of high-profile cases, and do you think they will be resolved quickly, or should we expect them to take a long time?

I wish I could say that high-profile cases are always examined at a pace that allows for a fair and unbiased trial. Unfortunately, the reality is more complicated.

The shortage of judges and the temporary transfers between lower and higher courts lead, in some cases, to delays and retrials, and in others to unusual accelerations, fuelled by intemperate political rhetoric. In these circumstances, political interest cannot be ruled out, whether in slowness or in haste.

The Vladimir Plahotniuc case, which was recently examined at a very rapid pace, raises legitimate questions, given that the alleged offences are more than ten years old and involve extremely complex cases which, if delayed, may become time barred. It is true that high-level corruption cases must be examined swiftly — “justice delayed is justice denied”, a principle enshrined in ECHR case law — but speed must not appear to be the result of political pressure. Statements by politicians boasting about the speed of the trial, in which the defendant does not even manage to read the case file, seriously undermine confidence in the independence of the judiciary.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Igor Dodon case, examined by the Supreme Court of Justice, was restarted from scratch after almost three years due to the replacement of a temporarily transferred judge. Although the restart may be procedurally justified, the inconsistency created by changes in judicial panels and the broader political context raise questions. During the three years of examination, all three judges from the original panel were gradually replaced, without this previously leading to the proceedings being restarted.

The political context also raises questions. Igor Dodon is the leader of the PSRM, the party with which PAS governed in alliance between 2019 and 2021 and with which a new alliance was not ruled out even after the parliamentary elections in autumn 2025. In these circumstances, the sudden changes in the pace of the case may have several explanations, including some that are not strictly legal.

A similar pattern was observed in the Ilan Shor case, where successive changes of courts and judges led to an excessively lengthy examination.

What is certain is that changing judges remains one of the most effective methods of delaying cases, especially high-profile ones. This was also demonstrated in a recent documentary by Recorder journalists about the capture of justice in Romania. Therefore, the discussion about the speed with which high-level corruption cases are examined in the Republic of Moldova becomes all the more sensitive, as those responsible for the “gearbox” of justice should understand very well how these selective accelerations and slowdowns are perceived by the public.

Strengthening the prosecution service

Do you think the government will continue with the idea of forming PACCO by merging PA and PCCOCS, or has this reform been put on hold, with no clarity about the future of these prosecutor’s offices?

I would like to believe that the idea of creating the Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Prosecutor’s Office (PACCO) will be abandoned. The European Commission’s November 2025 report takes note of this initiative but avoids recommending it, instead encouraging the strengthening of the existing Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office and improved cooperation with the National Anti-Corruption Centre, rather than its liquidation.

Just recently, the Venice Commission was due to adopt, at its 145th plenary session, a joint opinion with the Council of Europe’s Directorate of Human Rights on the draft law to create PACCO. For the time being, there is no additional public information on its content, but I am sceptical that the opinion could be favourable, given the risks this project poses from the perspective of the rule of law and European standards.

Another serious reason for abandoning this idea is the violation of commitments made to the International Monetary Fund, which aimed to strengthen the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, not to abolish it. The consequences have already been serious, including the loss of approximately 2.9 billion lei in funding for the Republic of Moldova.

In addition, it is legitimate to ask what the point was of vetting PA and PCCOCS prosecutors if they were then to be transferred to territorial prosecutor’s offices that do not undergo vetting, while the new structure would be staffed with temporary prosecutors. Such a scenario would inevitably lead to delays in high-level corruption cases, the compromise of investigations, and the risk of statutes of limitations expiring, thereby undermining the entire anti-corruption reform.

Self-reform, independent of political factors

What is your view on the idea of vetting lawyers, which has been discussed publicly? How do you assess such an idea, and can politicians legitimately express this point of view, or should any reform be solely a matter for the legal profession?

The idea of vetting lawyers seems to me profoundly misguided and dangerous for the rule of law. The legal profession is a liberal and independent profession, and this independence from the state is essential for guaranteeing the right to defence. Any political interference in the evaluation of lawyers would undermine this guarantee.

There are no such practices in functioning democracies. The only identifiable comparable example is Iran in 2018, where such an initiative was used to limit the right to defence and was harshly criticised internationally. Therefore, reforms within the legal profession can and must come exclusively from within the profession itself, not from the political sphere.

Thank you!