Former Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Cristina Lesnic gave an interview to the FES/APE Foreign Policy Newsletter, in which we discussed the prospects for the Transnistrian issue in the context of Moldova’s accession to the European Union. She spoke about the situation on the left bank of the Nistru and the complex problems generated by this territory, which is under the de facto control of a regime loyal to Moscow and currently finds itself in a precarious balance between economic survival and political obedience to the Kremlin.

There is a lot of discussion about Moldova’s accession to the European Union, but much less about integration into the EU with or without the Transnistrian region. How necessary do you think it is to bring the Transnistrian issue into the conversation more frequently and to discuss it in greater depth in the context of the EU accession process?

The Transnistrian issue must be viewed in a broader context. Moldov’as integration and accession to the European Union naturally imply the implementation of European standards in the Transnistrian region as well.

At the international level, the Republic of Moldova has recognised borders, and the territory of the Transnistrian region has not been recognised by any entity as an area where European Union standards would not apply. In fact, the process of implementing EU standards has already begun with the application of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova. At that time, economic operators from the Transnistrian region registered with the constitutional authorities on the right bank in order to benefit from DCFTA facilities and the right to export to the European Union.

Therefore, the Republic of Moldova must, without question, integrate together with the Transnistrian region. The European Union does not have strict rules concerning unresolved conflicts, and the way in which we adapt and extend the accession process to the entire territory of the country depends exclusively on the Republic of Moldova.

At the same time, it is useful to analyse the experiences of other Member States, such as Cyprus, which face similar challenges, or of certain European regions with special status, in order to identify good practices. However, it is not necessary to copy solutions, but to adapt them realistically to Moldova’s specific context.

An essential element of the EU accession process is the securing of the Republic of Moldova’s borders — particularly the uncontrolled segment of the border with Ukraine in the transnistrian region — and the continued implementation of joint Moldovan-Ukrainian border control. This involves both the border police and the customs service, which must work closely together to ensure effective oversight.

With regard to citizens living and working in the Transnistrian region, it is extremely important that they are properly informed about the benefits of the EU accession process.

I am therefore convinced that the Moldovan authorities need to develop specific, coherent, and accessible guidelines and explanatory materials on key areas such as the economy, agriculture, the environment, and social protection. These should clearly outline the tangible advantages of EU accession so that citizens in the region — including the unconstitutional administrative structures in Tiraspol — have access to clear, transparent, and accurate information about the European process and its benefits.

Plans for the future

How do you view the fact that the Moldovan authorities still do not have a well-defined contingency plan in the event that the separatist regime in Tiraspol were to collapse tomorrow?

Such documents and plans are not made public for security reasons. As a state, we must ensure both internal and external security — especially if we aspire to become an integral part of the European Union.

The Republic of Moldova currently hosts a peacekeeping mission, and the current government has repeatedly expressed its intention to transform this mission into one with an international mandate. What this new mission model will look like in concrete terms, and what the implementation algorithm will be, remains to be determined by the competent authorities, as they hold the national mandate on security matters. When we speak about safety and security, we are referring to a constitutional mandate — and such issues cannot be discussed outside the state’s institutional framework.

It should be noted that the current peacekeeping mission in the Republic of Moldova has certain structural shortcomings. Firstly, the participation of women is almost non-existent — even though many women in the defence system take part in international peacekeeping missions, they are not included in the internal peacekeeping mission within the Republic of Moldova.

Furthermore, the Security Zone remains a sensitive area where local communities need support to become more resilient. For this reason, it is essential to actively collaborate with mayors and local administrations in localities situated on the left bank of the Nistru River, particularly within the Security Zone, in order to make full use of local experience and expertise.

Only by involving these communities and strengthening their capacities can we ensure that security and cooperation mechanisms function effectively — and that the reintegration process advances in a safe and sustainable manner.

Energy strategy

How significant is the risk posed by Russia to the region’s gas supplies? Could Russia quickly trigger a major humanitarian crisis in the Republic of Moldova if it decided to halt gas deliveries to the region?

Regarding the gas supply system, it should be noted that Moldova is currently the supplier of natural gas to the Transnistrian region. ANRE’s decision in this regard is binding on all parties and can be changed only in the event of fundamental shifts — for example, progress toward accession to the European Union.

When we speak about the approximately 350,000 people living on the left bank of the Nistru, we must understand that they cannot be abandoned. They are citizens of the Republic of Moldova, and the state has a duty to approach the issue from a much broader perspective.

Energy independence — in terms of supply sources and diversification — depends largely on the strategy adopted by the constitutional authorities. There are, o course, multiple factors influencing this process. It is true that the Russian Federation has exerted significant pressure over time, but the Republic of Moldova has demonstrated its ability to withstand these challenges.

The situation becomes even more complex when crises are interconnected. In a relatively short period, the Republic of Moldova has gone through the pandemic crisis, followed by the energy crisis, while also facing an unresolved conflict.

We cannot ignore this reality. The better we understand the context in which we can achieve independence from any form of constraint in access to resources — whether natural or financial — the better we can develop a coherent plan that can be implemented gradually and deliver sustainable results.

In this regard, reducing energy dependence on Russian gas and reorganising Moldovagaz so that it no longer holds a monopoly but shares responsibilities with EnergoCom is a strategy being implemented by the Government in cooperation with the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

It remains to be seen how consistent this effort will be in the period ahead, particularly with respect to procuring energy resources for the cold season and preparing the next heating cycle, so that the country does not return to past vulnerabilities.

Maintaining the current status quo

Why do you think the Tiraspol regime is not accessing the EUR 60 million in energy assistance provided by the European Union? What would it signify if Tiraspol decided to take advantage of this aid, and under what conditions could such financial support be accessed — or withheld?

Let’s look at this issue from a broader perspective, because the structures in the Transnistrian region  depend to a large extent on the impetus — the catalyst — coming from the Russian Federation. What is currently happening in the region does not reflect any real form of independence, but rather a deep dependence — military, social, and financial. These three dimensions sustain and perpetuate the current regime in Tiraspol.

The fact that the region’s administration shows interest in certain economic advantages — and we can see that, in negotiations, Tiraspol frequently raises economic demands to the detriment of human rights or social concerns — demonstrates that maintaining economic viability is a top priority for this regime.

In reality, the region seeks to preserve the current status quo and avoid any significant change that could disrupt the existing balance of power. Looking back about ten years, we can recall that in 2014, following the introduction of the liberalised visa regime with the European Union, many citizens on the left bank of the Nistru River renewed their Moldovan documents in order to travel freely within the EU.

Exactly the same approach must now apply to the Association Agreement: people need to understand that dependence on the Russian Federation brings neither development nor real opportunities.

Our European orientation is clear, and our responsibility must be equally clear. The Transnistrian region continues to depend on the Russian Federation, especially through its leaders, who tie their positions to Moscow’s political, financial, and military support.

Moreover, the presence of Russian troops illegally stationed in the region remains a major threat to the security of the Republic of Moldova and a serious obstacle to strengthening internal stability and advancing our rapprochement with the European Union.

The need to attract funds for reintegration

Would it be necessary to establish, starting now, a special fund for the reintegration of the Transnistrian region, in cooperation with Moldova’s Western partners? Experts have estimated that reintegrating the two banks of the Nistru could cost around EUR 500 million annually, at least in the early years. Can such steps be taken at this stage?

Certainly, yes. The fund for implementing reintegration activities in communities within the Security Zone is indeed very small, yet it holds major importance for these local communities.

However, this fund — which, over time, has undergone some adjustments in terms of reintegration priorities is not sufficient to meet the real needs of the Republic of Moldova. The discrepancies between the left and right banks of the Nistru are extremely wide, including differences in retirement age, the calculation of child benefits, the cost of medical services, and other social aspects. All these disparities reflect deep structural imbalances between the two banks of the Nistru.

As the Republic of Moldova on the right bank advances on the path of European integration while the Transnistrian region remains behind, these discrepancies are becoming increasingly pronounced. Therefore, the Reintegration Fund should not be limited solely to financing projects in the Security Zone.

First and foremost, this fund must be supplemented with additional financial resources, and this depends on two key factors.

On the one hand, the Government Decision must be amended to clearly stipulate that the fund is not composed exclusively of state budget resources but can also be replenished from other external sources. On the other hand, mechanisms must be created to allow international and regional projects — including those financed by the European Union — to be accessed by beneficiaries on the left bank of the Nistru. This can be done either through the involvement of authorities on the right bank or through cooperation between both sides of the river. Such projects should contribute to the development of local communities, the strengthening of trust, and the enhancement of regional security.

It is therefore essential that the Reintegration Fund be reviewed, expanded, and aligned with national priorities. It must be diversified both in terms of funding sources and in the mechanisms through which resources reach beneficiaries, so that the reintegration process becomes sustainable and effective in the long term.

Superior development model

Could Chisinau’s strategy of presenting to the citizens on the left bank of the Nistru a superior development model — one based on cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the European Union — prove successful? Could a higher standard of living on the right bank attract the inhabitants of Transnistria?

We have many people from the left bank of the Nistru who frequently travel to the right bank and can clearly see the changes taking place in the territory controlled by the constitutional authorities. They observe progress in areas such as education, social policy, and the economy, noting greater stability and higher living standards.

I am convinced that these developments are both noticed and appreciated. However, due to the pressure exerted in the region and the climate of fear and intimidation created by the Tiraspol administration, many people do not dare to publicly express their support for the idea of joining the European Union.

Very few opinion polls have been conducted in the Transnistrian region regarding the population’s perception of European integration. And even when such surveys are carried out — whether by telephone or face to face — people tend to speak in whispers, afraid of the possible consequences.

It is crucial to create conditions that allow these people to express themselves freely, so that their voices can truly be heard. Beyond the walls imposed by the Transnistrian regime and its power structures, there are thousands of citizens who sincerely want the region to follow a European path.

This orientation must be acknowledged and built upon in order to give value to local experience and bring the issue of the country’s reintegration back onto the public and political agenda — not as a process imposed from above, but as a natural choice of the people on both banks of the Nistru River.

How do you see Ukraine continuing to respond to the security threat posed by this region, given that it is illegally hosting Russian troops on its territory?

I am certain that, on the agenda of our Ukrainian colleagues, the Transnistrian issue continues to be regarded as a potential destabilising factor — particularly because of the ammunition depot in Cobasna — but also because, during certain electoral cycles and changes of power in Chisinau, Ukraine monitors developments in the Republic of Moldova with increased vigilance.

Maintaining Moldov’as European path is one of the key factors that can strengthen Ukraine’s confidence, especially when we speak about our shared ambitions to join the European Union.

I am convinced that as long as the European integration process continues and Chisinau and Kyiv maintain a constant and transparent dialogue, tensions will subside. Ultimately, any lasting relationship between the two countries must be based on mutual trust, and the European trajectory must remain firm and irreversible.

With regard to bilateral cooperation in the field of security, it is the responsibility of law enforcement agencies, as well as defence and public order institutions, to maintain continuous communication and to demonstrate that the Republic of Moldova manages all aspects of security and stability in a coherent and professional manner.

It is essential to show that the Republic of Moldova is not a source of vulnerability, but a provider of security — both within its borders and beyond. Being situated on the border of the European Union, we have a duty to build a reintegrated Moldova based on dialogue, negotiation, mediation, and peaceful reconstruction.

This, in fact, is the most important objective we must uphold. Any political, social, or financial escalation within the Republic of Moldova could generate instability factors that, in turn, might influence Kyiv’s decisions and its perception of regional security.

Thank you!