We spoke with three experts in an extensive interview conducted for the FES/APE Foreign Policy Bulletin, in which we addressed the most significant risks and challenges that the Republic of Moldova is likely to face this year. Our interlocutors were Mihai Isac and Ștefan Bejan from Watchdog Community, as well as Angela Grămadă, Director of the think tank Experts for Security and Global Affairs (ESGA).

The discussion focused on possible developments related to the Transnistrian issue and the situation in Gagauzia, as well as the war in Ukraine and its consequences for the Republic of Moldova. We also addressed the reform agenda and the country’s European path, as well as the ability of the current pro-European government to deliver on the commitments made following the 2025 parliamentary elections.

Ștefan Bejan, Watchdog Community

What are the main security risks and challenges facing the Republic of Moldova in 2026, and which issues should we pay particular attention to this year?

First and foremost, the situation in the Republic of Moldova will largely depend on developments in the war in Ukraine, including the situation on the front line. A more aggressive Russia would automatically translate into greater challenges for Republic of Moldova. I expect Moldova’s airspace to continue to be violated by the Russian Federation, including through the use of drones. There is a risk that some of these drones could be equipped with explosives and enter the territory of the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, the hybrid war has not diminished; on the contrary, it has taken on new dimensions, particularly following the September elections. No one seriously believes the narrative that Russia has lost interest in the Republic of Moldova. On the contrary, we are witnessing coordinated actions by politicians in Chișinău, journalists, and bloggers—operating at different levels but pursuing the same objective. This pattern of coordination is likely to continue in 2026.

In your view, what will be the main challenges facing the government in Chișinău this year?

From my perspective, the main challenges will be economic. Visible economic growth would reduce the impact of hybrid warfare. It is essential to keep inflation under control and to stimulate investment. Only under these conditions will the Republic of Moldova be better able to withstand external pressures.

At the same time, in 2024 and especially in 2025, law enforcement institutions—the police, the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS), and the Prosecutor’s Office— were heavily focused on dismantling electoral corruption schemes. As a result, other internal issues have been overshadowed, including drug use and trafficking, arms trafficking, and even issues often perceived as minor, such as road accidents.

Why are these “minor” issues so important? Because they directly affect public sentiment. A society that does not trust its institutions and does not see tangible results is far more vulnerable to manipulation, corruption, and falling into the trap of Russia’s propaganda.

There is also growing discussion around the Transnistrian issue, which could be approached from a new perspective in 2026, given the economic volatility in the eastern regions of the Republic of Moldova.

The Transnistrian issue remains one of the most serious challenges. Russia continues to use the Transnistrian region as a tool of pressure, including through energy crises that directly affect the Republic of Moldova. At the same time, Chișinău appears to be making numerous concessions without achieving tangible results.

What is needed is a clear reintegration plan and a more decisive approach. Human rights violations in the region are becoming increasingly frequent, while leaders in Tiraspol are building political capital through direct attacks on Chișinău. In this context, responses must be firmer and more resolute.

In the same vein as the challenges in pro-Russian areas, could the Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit continue to represent a source of instability for the authorities in Chișinău?

Yes. We are facing important elections in Gagauzia, and it is very likely that new elections will take place, including for the position of Bashkan of the region. Chișinău must bring the Gagauz autonomy back within the constitutional framework of the Republic of Moldova; otherwise, the risks of destabilisation will increase.

When it comes to the reform challenges linked to EU accession, which ones do you see as the most important for the period ahead?

I see at least two major reforms as essential. The first is administrative-territorial reform. Local elections are scheduled for 2027, and such a reform must be implemented at least one year in advance. Naturally, there will be discontent at the local level, as the abolition or merger of some municipalities generates resistance. This is why the government must explain very clearly why this reform is in the interest of citizens and of the Republic of Moldova as a whole.

Optimisation in the field of education must also continue. Education is our only real chance to escape poverty, and quality education cannot be delivered in schools with 50 pupils and no qualified teachers. For this reason, optimisation and deep reform in this sector must move forward.

At the same time, long-standing problems persist, particularly in the area of justice reform. Progress is being made, but it remains slow. There are convictions, yet in some cases sentences are not served—either because those convicted are not apprehended or because they manage to flee the country. This is precisely why the reform process must continue. The moment when corrupt individuals and criminals actually end up in prison will be the signal that restores and strengthens public trust.

Mihai Isac, political analyst

What do you see as the main internal political challenge facing the Republic of Moldova in the coming period?

The main domestic political challenge is to accelerate the reform process, which has increasingly become a matter of security. Without deep and rapid reforms, the Republic of Moldova will not be able to maintain a credible pace of European integration. This concerns structural reforms in the justice system, local public administration, and the economy, as well as the strengthening of the overall anti-corruption architecture.

When it comes to combating corruption, the challenge goes beyond addressing corrupt practices within public administration. It also involves putting in place robust mechanisms to prevent the misappropriation of European funds. As Moldova advances on its European path, the risks increase, and institutions must be prepared to manage significantly larger volumes of financial resources in a transparent and accountable manner.

How problematic could the Transnistrian issue become this year, and what prospects do you see in this regard?

The region on the left bank of the Dniester River, under Russian military presence, will inevitably return to the public agenda. This will occur both in the context of negotiations with the European Union and as a result of growing pressure from civil society and the population on both sides of the Dniester, who are demanding concrete solutions to overcome the current situation.

At the same time, the Russian Federation will seek to exploit this context in order to destabilise social cohesion within the Republic of Moldova. We are likely to see actions aimed at generating tension, mistrust, and polarisation, including through the instrumentalisation of sensitive regional issues. In parallel, pressure from civil society and citizens on the authorities to identify a viable solution to the situation in the Transnistrian region is expected to intensify.

From a political perspective, will Gagauzia remain a vulnerable point this year?

Yes. Local elections in Gagauzia, the region inhabited by the Gagauz community, will create a renewed opportunity for the Russian Federation to exert political pressure on Chișinău. In addition, the situation surrounding the election of the governor (Bashkan) remains complicated, given that the current governor is unable to exercise her mandate.

As a result, the situation in Gagauzia is likely to continue to be exploited for external political purposes, posing ongoing challenges for the Republic of Moldova.

What risks does the Republic of Moldova face in the context of peace negotiations on Ukraine, and what should Chișinău do in this situation?

The authorities in Chișinău must be extremely careful to ensure that decisions taken in the context of peace negotiations do not set dangerous precedents for the Republic of Moldova. This applies whether we are referring to the status of Russian troops stationed on the left bank of the Dniester, the pressure exerted by the Russian Federation for a possible federalisation of Moldova, or issues related to the status of the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church in the Republic of Moldova.

At the same time, the authorities in Chișinău must exercise increased caution in order not to be confronted with a fait accompli resulting from negotiations between the United States, the European Union, and the Russian Federation.

What economic challenges can the authorities of the Republic of Moldova expect to face this year?

Although Moldova’s economy has recorded modest growth of only a few per cent, the economic pressure generated by Russia’s war against Ukraine remains significant. The indirect costs of the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine continue to be strongly felt in the Republic of Moldova.

At the same time, the authorities need to develop new mechanisms for bilateral diplomacy in order to strengthen and deepen relations with individual European Union Member States. It is not sufficient to maintain good relations with the European Union as a whole; it is essential to build solid, strategic partnerships with each Member State individually.

This approach is necessary to avoid situations similar to those faced by Ukraine, where the opposition of a single country—such as Hungary, and potentially others like Slovakia—can block strategic decisions. The Republic of Moldova must ensure that it does not become hostage to the internal political interests of individual European governments.

What role will the Republic of Moldova’s security partnerships with Western states play this year?

Military cooperation with partner states must be continued and deepened. This applies both to European Union Member States and to NATO countries, as well as other strategic partners. The Republic of Moldova should cultivate privileged security relations with key actors such as the United Kingdom and Canada.

The relationship with the United States is also essential for Chișinău. Moldova must learn to engage more effectively in Washington. The international order is being reconfigured, and Chișinău needs to understand and speak the language of the new American political realities in order to clearly articulate its interests, the benefits of a strong partnership with the United States, and its own security and development needs.

The Republic of Moldova would also benefit significantly from strengthening its economic diplomacy. Chișinău should move beyond the assumption that only large investors can rescue the economy. For many regions of the country, attracting small and medium-sized enterprises represents the only viable long-term solution.

Last but not least, the Republic of Moldova needs updated legislation to ensure a genuine separation between religion and politics. It is essential that the Russian Orthodox Church in Moldova no longer be used as an electoral instrument by pro-Russian political forces.

Angela Grămadă, Experts for Security and Global Affairs (ESGA)

What will be the main domestic policy challenge for the Republic of Moldova this year?

The main challenge is rebuilding dialogue with Gagauzia, in particular with the authorities in Comrat. For the time being, I do not see sufficient initiative on the part of the government to take control of the crisis that began in 2023.

Why do you consider the situation in Gagauzia to be so problematic?

Given the manner in which Evghenia Guțul was elected as Bashkan and the fact that she was subsequently convicted, new elections need to be organised.

Neither in May 2023 nor at present have I seen any serious analysis by the ruling party of the resources available, the instruments that could be used, or the measures that could be applied to reduce the influence of Russian disinformation and propaganda in the region.

This represents a major domestic policy challenge, especially since this model could be replicated in other parts of the Republic of Moldova. I am referring, for example, to Orhei in the north of the country, or to other areas where risk factors exist that could have a direct impact on internal security.

There is extensive discussion among experts— but less so among the authorities—about the Transnistrian issue. How do you see it evolving in 2026?

An extremely important challenge lies in the authorities’ ability to explain much more clearly what the Republic of Moldova’s vision is for resolving the Transnistrian conflict, especially in the context of the emerging concept of “decoupling” territorial reintegration from European integration.

Why is this concept of decoupling problematic? Because it was introduced without sufficient justification. This lack of clarity weakens Moldova’s ability to explain to its partners—particularly those in the European Union— that the country is capable of managing the European integration process in a unified manner for all its citizens, without creating internal divisions or forms of segregation.

How does this affect Moldova’s European path?

It diminishes the results achieved so far. The Republic of Moldova has previously demonstrated that it is capable of pursuing a unified approach and a coherent vision for reintegration. Instruments such as the Association Agreement have delivered tangible benefits, including for residents on the left bank of the Nistru River. These are models that should be further developed, not abandoned.

At this stage, the concept of decoupling remains poorly substantiated and risks undermining the overall management of the European integration process.

How does the Transnistrian issue relate to the regional security context, particularly in relation to Ukraine?

At this point, we inevitably enter the realm of security. The Republic of Moldova has sought to distance itself from the peace negotiations on Ukraine, arguing that these are separate issues and that Moldova’s situation is that of a frozen conflict. However, it is also in Ukraine’s interest that the issue of the separatist Transnistrian region be addressed before peace negotiations are finalised.

This is important for Kyiv because Transnistria represents a security risk for Ukraine from the south west. We are therefore facing a window of opportunity that the Republic of Moldova risks missing. Such a failure would weaken Moldova’s credibility in the eyes of its European partners, who do not want a “grey area” or a “black hole” of insecurity within a country that is a candidate for European Union membership.

One cannot join the European Union while having an uncontrolled territory or an area lacking constitutional authority. The absence of effective control over the Transnistrian region raises serious concerns related to security and governance.

What does the socio-economic picture look like for the Republic of Moldova in this context in 2026?

Even though many of the economic risks are driven by external developments, they continue to affect the Republic of Moldova directly. Foreign investors tend to view the entire region with caution, rather than focusing solely on the performance of the government in Chișinău. Even where there are genuine efforts to attract investment and constructive dialogue with international investors, the broader security risks surrounding Moldova shape overall investment perceptions.

This represents a structural vulnerability that the Republic of Moldova cannot fully control, as it depends not only on domestic policies but also on developments across the wider region.

What other vulnerabilities and challenges do you see within the domestic political class, and what should we pay particular attention to in 2026?

There are political actors who publicly present themselves as pro-European but who, in reality, promote other interests. We see a discourse that appears supportive of European integration, yet is combined with a simplistic notion of sovereignty and practices that contradict European democratic standards.

There is a serious problem within the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova in Chișinău. Although several parliamentary factions exist, in practice they are often composed of political forces that claim to be pro European but whose actions and messaging serve pro Russian interests. This political ambiguity undermines the credibility of the Republic of Moldova’s European path.

Thank you!