Igor Munteanu, leader of the Coalition for Unity and Prosperity Party (CUB), gave an interview to the FES/APE foreign policy newsletter in which we discussed the main challenges Moldova will face this year. We talked about the energy crisis in the Transnistrian region caused by Russia’s ambitions to destabilize the Republic of Moldova and the levers of pressure Moscow still exerts on Chisinau. We discussed Russia’s proxy war in Ukraine and its impact on Moldova. Last but not least, we talked about how vital it is for all pro-European forces to come together ahead of this year’s elections to face the Kremlin’s growing threats to the Republic of Moldova and, by extension, to the whole of Europe. We invite you to read the full interview with Igor Munteanu, leader of the CUB and former Moldovan Ambassador to the USA.

What are the main challenges for the Republic of Moldova in 2025? I would like to start with the energy crisis that Russia is causing in the Republic of Moldova: what is its impact and how can it evolve?

The energy crisis needs to be seen in a wider context in which Eastern Europe is a target of the Russian Federation

in a war it declared in 2014-2015, when Russia categorically opposed the inclusion of the Eastern Partnership countries in an Association Agreement with the European Union. Since then, it has constantly ventured and raised the stakes on several levels. The energy crisis is therefore part of a long-term strategy in which, first and foremost, the Russian Federation has sought the capitulation of the European Union.

Because when your energy market depends 35% on hydrocarbons and gas imported from Russia, your principledness is diminished by economic interest. So, Russia aimed to hit the transatlantic relationship and the small vulnerable states.

But let’s get back to today’s current events. The Russian Federation considers the tools it has at its disposal – energy and intimidation and fear of high prices – for capitulation of governments. If the populations of our countries were more prosperous, Russian intimidation would not work, because we would adapt completely to the European market, prices, and tariffs.

In that case, the Russian Federation would not be able to impose its point of view. But as long as the Republic of Moldova has remained dependent on and anchored to an electricity supply network inherited from the Soviet regime and maintaining prices through subsidization policies for the poor population, the Russian Federation has considered that it is entitled to intervene with aggressive campaigns and propaganda.

Ukraine has naturally decoupled as a result of defending itself from foreign military intervention. In contrast, the Republic of Moldova has not immediately decoupled, even after 2022, erroneously believing that the Russian Federation will not have a policy of disconnecting its highly vulnerable separatist enclave [Transnistrian region], but financially and energetically patronized by the Russian Federation.

Until the very last minute, Chisinau maintained an erroneous thesis that we are safe and that the Russian Federation will not stop supplying natural gas to the Transnistrian separatist region for nothing, from which we will get the electricity we need.

This point of view was erroneous and emphasized, in any case, the delusion of the current Recean government in the context in which the Russian Federation sees around it only victims or only adversaries.

Energy independence as “zero priority”

Where does the Republic of Moldova stand in this context from Russia’s perspective?

We certainly cannot be an adversary of the Russian Federation, but we are certainly its victim. The escalation of the situation or these crises has demonstrated first of all that the Russian Federation does not value the attachment to Russkii Mir of the population on the left bank of the Dniester. Secondly, the Russian Federation’s first and foremost concern is to overthrow the government in Chisinau and then to maintain a policy of patronage in relation to its regional clientele. Under these circumstances, surely the only option the government has at the moment is not to delude itself, to accelerate to the best of our ability the works on the connection of high-voltage power lines with Romania and the EU, so that natural gas and electricity do not depend on the Transnistrian Moldgres or external actors.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the energy crisis is just one component of Moldova’s economic vulnerabilities. Because there is no point in making the connection if the population is not be able to pay those tariffs.

The adaptation of the population to Romanian tariffs and the European market is a mandatory condition. It is as important as implementing the acquis communautaire. And for that you need to invest heavily in economic recovery, in attracting investment and increasing the welfare of the population.

While it may seem to some like some kind of rosy dream, this is the only way to decoupling from the harmful influence of the Russian Federation – increasing the incomes of the population, increasing the economic resilience and the ability of the population to withstand any kind of shocks delivered with kindness from the imperialist metropolis.

Transactionalism and its effects

Another challenge that we see as extremely important is Russia’s war in Ukraine and its impact on Moldova. What can we expect from this perspective in 2025 for the Republic of Moldova?

Apparently, the objectives formulated by the new US President Donald Trump, namely that in 24 hours he will end the war, have aroused nothing but hilarity. Because this war cannot be ended by a deal made without substantial geopolitical effort.

And I think that after handing over the obligation to set the necessary conditions on a ‘big deal’ to General Keith Kellogg [special representative for the Ukraine-Russia conflict], we should expect these two sides to start negotiating – America and Russia.

At the same time, this war will not come to an end if Ukraine’s interests are severely damaged and Ukraine does not receive any assurances or guarantees about its future. This means that a “big deal” like Yalta or Munich will not solve the problem over the Ukrainians’ heads. And this is a matter of principle.

Looking for solid security guarantees

How is the Republic of Moldova affected by these deals and what can Chisinau do about it?

The Republic of Moldova is in the same context of insecurity and conventional and hybrid attacks as Georgia, for example, and it is very carefully dodging. This is what we have seen in the last few years of PAS government, not to provoke, although this is almost impossible to avoid. The Republic of Moldova, too, need to look for other viable, solid security guarantees which will guarantee its citizens that in the event of a shaky peace, the Russian Federation will not feel entitled to come to Chisinau and install its own puppet governments. And this, again, is not just about the gifts we may or may not receive, but about a few important things.

About a plan B – that means a plan that is shared and assumed by the Republic of Moldova, Romania, Poland – to defend our borders and our population, first of all. And, secondly, we certainly need more internal cohesion, so that these plans do not reverberate only to the party in government, but also to the majority of the population.

There must be a consensus of the majority of the population on what we want. There must be consensus on our desire to be protected and not to encourage military intervention to come upon us.

And that calls for different approaches from the government than it has shown in the last four years, in my view. Of course, in addition to the efforts being made by the United States to bring Russia to the negotiating table in a formula that accepts the preservation of Ukrainian statehood and the preservation of large parts of the territory that belongs to the Ukrainian state, the Europeans have so far been missing from this equation. And this is very regrettable.

Because on the one hand, this signals once again to the Russian Federation that Brussels doesn’t matter, just as the voices of the European community don’t matter, only a peace of two in a duet between the Americans and the Russians.

Enhancing the EU’s role on the international stage by revitalizing the military industrial complex

What is to be done in such a context? What could be the solutions for the EU?

This, in a way, neglects the importance and strategic value of the European Union in the wider framework. It will be up to European leaders – from NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to the most influential states in Central and Western Europe– to find ways to be relevant.

And that means restarting the military industrial complex, attaching the European identity to the military budgets that are sure to increase, and preparing contingency plans, both military and economic.

The fact that, for example, since January, natural gas imports from the Russian Federation have increased 12- fold since January, speaks to the fact that European economies have still not adapted to this confrontation with their Eastern neighbour and adversary. And I do not know whether this vulnerability will be compensated immediately with liquefied gas supplies from the USA. Although that would be a solution, it also depends on prices and it depends on the respect that the USA will show from now on towards the European identity.

So to be European is to be weak or vulnerable, and this is a principled or strategic issue on the agenda of all states that are part of the European space, behind the curtain or inside the club.

Compromise and unity ahead of parliamentary elections

How important is it for the proEuropean forces to come together at this crucial moment for the future of the Republic of Moldova as we prepare for parliamentary elections and how much willingness do you see on the part of all Moldovan pro-European forces to compromise for a future alliance in order to re-establish a proEuropean governing coalition for the next four years?

First of all, if we are talking about compromises, they are expected from the most powerful actor, formally, nominally and in general. That is about the strongest party in government today. Compromises from actors who are not represented in the current parliament is an illusion or naivety.

Secondly, the central element of a “Snagov Pact” is our ability to understand the need for a concert of voices and arguments for Moldova’s transformation, not a monopoly on power and a rejection of any critical views.

From this point of view, internal consolidation means first and foremost revisiting the misconceptions about the uniqueness or exclusivity or exclusive privilege of a single ruling party over all levers of power and historical truth. From this point of view, the year 2025 will be a chance to rethink the way in which pro-European actors will construct their plans or projections for the future, but it will also be a test of maturity of those in government.

If they want to retain power without yielding any of that power or without realizing that past mistakes have led to the very precarious state of governance. And not just because of the war or because of the Russians or because of the hybrid wars, but primarily because of the limited competence on strategic areas, economic growth, the functioning of democratic institutions, the key reforms that were promised and undelivered and the inclusion policy. And I am referring here not only to the inclusion of minorities or the inclusion of vulnerable groups, but, first and foremost, to the inclusion of points of view that must be complementary in an effort that can under no circumstances belong to a single political force.

In this dimension of consolidation, as you say, an important role will also be played by friendly governments in the immediate neighbourhood or in Western Europe. Because the crisis situation that is being maintained and is worsening at the moment is also the result of the short-sightedness they have shown over the years and the monopoly on political power that they have tolerated from the Action and Solidarity Party.

In order to be objectively connected to the truth, we need to understand other dimensions that sometimes may not be favourable, or may not be favourable and pleasant, but they are extremely necessary in order to understand how to get out of this systemic crisis in which we find ourselves at the beginning of 2025.

Thank you!