Mariana Kalughin, anti-corruption expert at Transparency International Moldova, gave an interview to the FES/APE Foreign Policy Bulletin, in which we discussed justice reform and its relationship with political influence. The conversation covered the effectiveness of the vetting process, the way it is currently implemented as a precondition for justice reform, the evolution of major corruption cases in courts, and the conditions necessary to ensure judicial independence in the Republic of Moldova. We invite you to read the full interview below.

Anti-corruption: between instruments and implementation

- Ms. Kalughin, how do you assess, overall, the fight against corruption in the Republic of Moldova? Do you consider that the current institutional framework operates on sound and effective grounds?

- In my view, the fight against corruption in the Republic of Moldova is currently more declarative and populist than substantive. There is no shortage of relevant legislation in this field—the Integrity Law, the Law on the verification of holders and candidates for public office, the Law on polygraph testing, the Law on the declaration of assets and personal interests, the Law on institutional integrity assessment, the Law on whistleblowers, the Law on decision-making transparency, and the Law on access to information of public interest.

However, these instruments are not applied effectively. We have a complex anti-corruption framework— from public competitions and codes of ethics to mechanisms for declaring undue influence and gifts— yet its implementation remains incomplete.

There are also multiple authorities with anti-corruption responsibilities, including the National Integrity Authority, the National Anti-Corruption Center, the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Intelligence and Security Service. At the same time, the manner in which the leadership of these institutions is appointed makes them politically vulnerable and undermines their credibility.

Moreover, the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme lacks a genuine strategic dimension, which further limits its impact.

A comprehensive and objective evaluation of the entire system is needed—one that assesses the impact of the legal framework, the performance of institutions, and the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. However, such an exercise cannot be carried out as long as the field continues to be treated primarily through an electoral lens.

Insufficient reform

- How do you assess the vetting process? What are its advantages and limitations?

- I am, rather, an opponent than a supporter of the vetting process in the justice sector. Justice reform, like any reform, should represent a profound transformation aimed at improving an existing state of affairs.

Vetting cannot resolve the fundamental problems of the sector. There are no real deficiencies in the evaluation of the integrity of members of self-governing bodies, judges, or prosecutors. Nor are there deficiencies in monitoring integrity incidents within the system. There are already laws and institutions designed for these purposes.

The real issue lies in the implementation of existing mechanisms—such as the declaration of assets and interests, institutional integrity assessments, and the evaluation of individual performance—in a way that ensures that professionals in the system maintain their integrity despite corruption risks.

In my opinion, vetting disadvantages the justice sector through the precedent it creates. Any future political power could replicate this approach, invoking moralistic arguments and purist concerns. Vetting ultimately leads to the political alignment of the judiciary. As a consequence, we risk ending up with a judicial system that is fearful, obedient, and lacking in courage.

The von Hebel controversy

- How do you interpret the controversy surrounding the reappointment of Herman von Hebel to the vetting commission? Why do you think the government insisted on this appointment despite criticism from experts, civil society, and the media?

- This case once again confirms the politicized and flawed nature of the vetting process. It is not clear why the government insisted on this appointment despite strong public opposition. Regardless of the underlying reasons, the case represents an affront to common sense.

The manner in which the decision was carried out—through accelerated legislative amendments, without respecting the requirements of the legislative process or the necessary quorum—was, in itself, defiant.

Lack of convincing arguments

- How do you assess the need to restructure and reform specialized prosecutor’s offices? Is the creation of PACCO, bringing together APO and PCCOCS, justified?

- The legislative initiative is insufficiently substantiated. The author refers to an analysis of the system of specialized prosecutor’s offices in relation to forms of crime affecting national security. However, the explanatory note does not provide relevant data in this regard.

Only one possible trend could justify such an initiative—the significant involvement of organized criminal groups in corruption offenses.

However, the profile of corruption in the Republic of Moldova is different. The PACCO project is also problematic from the perspective of ensuring the most important conditions for combating corruption: independence, professional training, and adequate resources.

An unjustified institutional reorganization, such as the one proposed, risks harming personnel. Reconfiguring specialized prosecutor’s offices would result primarily in filtering the corps of prosecutors, rather than improving effectiveness.

In my view, the initiative pursued political— particularly electoral—objectives. This is also reflected in the explanatory note, where the author does not conceal that the idea of reconfiguration was driven largely by decisions of the Supreme Security Council concerning political and electoral corruption, in the context of the electoral cycle between the 2024 presidential elections and the 2025 parliamentary elections.

In reality, the aim appears to be the political alignment of specialized prosecutor’s offices, particularly the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office. Supporting evidence includes public statements by the President, the Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament expressing dissatisfaction with the performance of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, as well as the statements of the former head of the institution, who acknowledged being encouraged to resign.

I hope that, following the opinion of the Venice Commission, Members of Parliament will abandon the PACCO initiative.

Speed vs. fairness

- How do you assess the handling of high-profile cases today? Can we expect them to be examined swiftly?

- I would prefer not to comment on individual cases. It is difficult to assess a case without knowing its substance. Celerity is indeed a condition of efficient justice. However, it would be deeply problematic if, in pursuing speed, the principles and standards of a fair trial were sacrificed or the rights of the parties were violated.

It is regrettable that some important cases—such as those involving Vladimir Plahotniuc—are being examined within a justice system that is itself undergoing vetting. This, from the outset, affects the credibility of the process.

The rule of the three “I’s”

- What are the main vulnerabilities of Moldova’s judicial system? On which dimensions do you think EU partners remain critical?

- It is often said that justice should function according to the rule of the three “I’s”: Independence, Impartiality, and Integrity. Among these, independence is fundamental. A judiciary cannot be impartial or possess integrity if it is not independent.

Standards in this field require the implementation of an appropriate legal framework for preventing corruption within the judiciary. At the same time, all necessary measures must be taken to promote a culture of judicial integrity and respect for the role of the judiciary.

However, the fight against corruption should not be used as a pretext to undermine judicial independence. Lustration is not necessarily the most appropriate anti-corruption tool.

A process in which all office holders are assessed from a corruption perspective—and those who fail are dismissed and possibly prosecuted—can be instrumentalized and misused to remove politically undesirable individuals. As long as judges and prosecutors are subject to a prolonged and potentially politicized external evaluation process, I am not convinced that they can be fully independent. I hope that external partners understand these concerns.

Risk of losing credibility

- To what extent do justice and anti-corruption reforms risk being perceived as politically influenced? How can their credibility be protected?

- Any reform risks losing credibility if it is implemented in disregard of fundamental principles. Ensuring the principle of separation and balance of powers is essential. In the Republic of Moldova, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers must be separate, while also cooperating within the limits established by the Constitution.

In line with international standards, dialogue between branches of power must respect this principle. This is a key condition for maintaining the credibility of reforms, especially in the justice sector. The judiciary must be free from inappropriate connections and undue influence from other branches of power.

Criticism between institutions must be expressed in a climate of mutual respect. Unbalanced or irresponsible public statements risk undermining public trust and, in some cases, may even affect the constitutional balance of a democratic state.

Simplistic arguments, demagogic slogans, and populist promises should have no place in inter institutional dialogue. The fight against corruption must not be used to undermine fundamental values.

Gap between expectations and reality

- Why does such a large gap persist between public expectations regarding anti-corruption and the results seen in courts?

- The gap between expectations and reality is the result of flawed political discourse. Unfortunately, due to deficiencies in the recording of criminal statistics, it is difficult to determine precisely the share of corruption offenses among all registered crimes. Based on annual reports of the Prosecutor General’s Office, I would estimate that corruption offenses do not exceed 3% of the total.

Naturally, high-level corruption represents an even smaller share. This does not mean the phenomenon is not dangerous or can be ignored. However, corruption should not be used as a universal explanation for every problem we face. Integrity is essential for good governance, but it cannot replace professionalism and responsibility.

- Thank you!