Radu Hossu, a wellknown Romanian war correspondent and humanitarian activist involved in supporting Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, spoke to the FES/ APE foreign policy newsletter about the potential of the Kiev-Chisinau-Bucharest relationship in the face of Russia’s increased militarism in the Black Sea basin. We also discussed strategies designed to benefit all three countries and military threats from Moscow. We invite you to read more of our discussion with Radu Hossu below:

At the last trilateral meeting in Odessa between the presidents of Ukraine, Moldova and Romania, there was a lot of discussion about co-operation. What is the potential for such co-operation between the three countries today?

Firstly, we need to look at the current context. We have a Ukraine that is being invaded by Russia, and Romania and the Republic of Moldova, which are practically also being hit by a war by the Russians, but not an open conflict, rather a hybrid war.

In fact, Russia is at war with Romania and the Republic of Moldova, except that it is a hybrid war, following the KGB methods of the 1960s and 1970s of Yuri Andropov, which they have now ”updated” to the Gherasimov doctrine. All three countries are in some kind of war and have a legitimate national security interest for the three countries to co-operate. The potential for cooperation and collaboration, in my view, breaks down into several important elements.

One is obviously national security. We are talking here about the security in the Black Sea region, the security of the Republic of Moldova, which is embraced in a positive sense by Romania and Ukraine, as long as Ukraine holds out. In order for Ukraine to resist, it also needs Romania, which is in the EU, and the help and support which Ukraine needs in order to resist and not fall under Russian influence throughout the Black Sea region which Russia wants.

At the same time, the Republic of Moldova has been fighting with Russia for a long time and has experience of fighting with Russia from which Romania could also learn. It is about the security plan, collaboration and cooperation. This is where this cooperation should be strengthened through all the pillars that can be used – diplomatic, political, economic and so on.

The second pillar is the economic pillar. Here we are talking about what is meant by inter-connectivity in the area of energy, the reconstruction of Ukraine and so on, because both Romania and the Republic of Moldova have made considerable efforts to support Ukrainian refugees and I am sure that Ukraine appreciates this. Somehow we should give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar. This means that the Republic of Moldova and Romania also have a seat at the table where the reconstruction of Ukraine will be discussed, or should have. But this is very much up to the politicians of each country.

Ukraine can also benefit economically from this reconstruction, but at the same time, Romania and the Republic of Moldova can also benefit by sending companies that can reconstruct not only buildings and infrastructure. We are talking here about absolutely the whole of Ukraine which needs, in one way or another, to be rebuilt or rescaled.

A lot of people forget that western Ukraine, at the moment, is somewhat overpopulated in terms of health infrastructure, education, road infrastructure and so on. It needs to be rescaled. That means investment again through an economic plan.

Then we also have a technological plan. Here we are talking about digitisation. Let’s not forget that Ukraine has the DIIA system [web portal and a mobile application that gives Ukrainian citizens access to digital public services – editor’s note], where you have absolutely all the documents on your phone in digital format. They can be instantly checked with a QR code by any authority that stops you in traffic, or if you go to a counter, you don’t need absolutely anything on paper, you get all your information on this app.

So we are talking about digitisation, which is something that Romania and Moldova are lacking. This is a decisive factor in reducing corruption in the public sector. And here we see that this cooperation on digitisation means that it can also come from Ukraine to Romania and the Republic of Moldova. We can also talk about cooperation in the area of defence, because Ukraine is currently a world leader in terms of design, production capacity and scalability in the area of equipment which operates without human input, i.e. without a pilot.

We are talking here about land, maritime and aerial drones, and I believe that the Republic of Moldova and Romania could also benefit tremendously from cooperation, a kind of tripartite joint venture. Romania and the Republic of Moldova should enter such a collaboration with Ukraine in such a way that all three can benefit from Ukrainian know-how and, in parallel, from the financial power that Romania has behind it, but also from the desire to help the Republic of Moldova in this situation.

The fourth pillar on the line of cooperation between the three countries that I see is the know-how and know-how on all elements, from three different perspectives - whether we are talking about the fight against corruption, the fight against Russian disinformation. That is to say, we have a country that is in the European Union – Romania –, we have a country that is being oppressed by a hybrid war – the Republic of Moldova – and we have a country that is in the middle of a war with the Russians – Ukraine.  

There is clearly different know-how here, but in a tripartite cooperation between the three countries, it would undoubtedly strengthen the safety and security of the citizens of these countries. This is important to be utilised from civil society to the political area, the economic and institutional environment. So, here we have know-how that can come from Romania, which is part of the European Union, given that its institutions have been reformed to a greater extent than in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

We have a direct know-how from Ukraine – the fight against the Russians in a hot war, and we have another know-how in the Republic of Moldova – the fight against hybrid warfare.

Threats from Transnistria

How much does a quick resolution of the Transnistrian issue mean for Ukraine, given that Russia still keeps troops in the breakaway Transnistrian region? What kind of threat does the Transnistrian region pose to Ukraine?

I don’t think Ukraine would want to see a Russian foot in Europe in general. Although I think the Transnistrian file is important, at the moment in Kiev they have an infinitely bigger problem, and here I mean the direct war with Russia.

And if one were to think that Russia would have the courage to open a new front in the Transnistrian region, Ukraine at this moment has the capabilities and the capacity to close this front quite quickly. That means also the number of soldiers, and the military capabilities in terms of advanced technological equipment compared to what exists in the Transnistrian military zone. However, such a scenario would create huge problems from a military perspective, but also from a political perspective, for the Republic of Moldova, Romania and, obviously, Ukraine.

This is why I believe that Ukraine is rather counting on the European Union and the Republic of Moldova to ensure that Transnistria remains stable and economically interconnected in one way or another with the European Union, precisely so that this region does not explode in Russia’s interests.

Communication strategies

How do you see Romania’s strategy of not communicating the real aid given to Ukraine because of extremist parties in Romania? President Nicushor Dan spoke at one point about the Monthly newsletter, No.6 (232), June 2025 11 possibility of changing this tactic. Do you think it is necessary to take a more tacit approach to aid or, on the contrary, could we talk about it more openly?

It’s a bad strategy on Romania’s part not to communicate this, as it has been until now, because this has allowed the penetration of the information space with false narratives coordinated from the Kremlin. This has created doubts among the population and frustrations on both sides of the political spectrum in Romania. I am referring here to the two major blocs: the pro-European and the extremist.

On the extremist side, it has created doubts and frustration that Romania is helping Ukraine too much, and on the other side, on the pro-European one, it has sowed doubts as to whether we are really security exporters, as the former president, Klaus Iohannis, used to say. It has raised doubts as to whether Romania is really helping Ukraine, with which we have the longest border. I really hope that this will change into an assumed approach, in the sense of changing from the communication point of view.

This would help not only in foreign policy but also in domestic policy. Thank goodness that we have gone through all the rounds of elections in Romania, and now we need a firm and assumed communication, especially from the beginning of the presidential term. We need to talk about how and why we are going to help Ukraine. Above all, we need to explain what the benefits are for Romania. Such a situation would reduce the vulnerabilities in the Romanian information space which the Kremlin exploits.

How is the help that Romania is currently giving to Ukraine appreciated in Kiev and how interested is Ukraine in a pro-European political stability in Bucharest?

Kiev is extremely interested in a pro-European stability in Romania and Moldova. Why? Because Ukraine needs allies at the moment, especially allies in its neighbourhood, in its legitimate fight against an aggressor, namely a state which it considers to be a terrorist state and which is run by a criminal regime.

I spoke in Kiev with sources in the government and in the Zelenski administration who are very appreciative of Romania’s help. I was amazed in the first year and a half of the war, not knowing what kind of help Romania was giving, at what Ukrainian officials were talking about. They were really delighted, and you could see on their faces that they were not trying to make me feel sorry just because I was Romanian, but they were really as serious as they could be. I also saw this in the statements of Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenski in 2023 and 2024.

However, since the political crisis in Romania took hold in November 2024, with the annulment of the elections by the Romanian Constitutional Court and the rise of extremism in Romania in terms of its share in the Romanian Parliament, Romania has slowed down and even halted, at least for a while, the aid to Ukraine. I assume that once the political situation has stabilised with the swearing in of the new Ilie Bolojan government and its ministers, this will stop and Romania will resume its aid to Ukraine. I am referring to military and economic aid, because it is important, even if it is not extraordinarily high compared to other parties’ aid.

But it is important, especially if we want to be a credible and reasonable partner when we go to the table to discuss the reconstruction of Ukraine, where Romania can have extraordinary economic and security benefits. But for that we really need to show that we are a credible partner.

Decisive elections

We will have decisive parliamentary elections in September in Chisinau. How important will it be for Kiev that a genuine pro-European governing alliance remains in Chisinau? How much will it matter to Kiev not to have a hostile pro-Russian government behind the front line in Chisinau?

I think the answer is very simple – very important! Because right now Ukraine is fighting on very many fronts. On the one hand, it is fighting a hot war with Russia. At the same time, it is fighting on diplomatic fronts, with the United States of America, to maintain support for the Ukrainian army, including with the European Union, where there is not necessarily a consensus, because we have Putin’s puppets there too. I am referring here to the Prime Ministers of Slovakia, Robert Fito, and Hungary, Viktor Orban.

I believe that it would be very damaging for the Republic of Moldova to be governed by a parliament which would use the Kremlin’s theories about neutrality and peace. This, during an aggression, actually shows that you stick with the aggressor.

I know that the Republic of Moldova has the neutrality part in its Constitution. I am not referring here to neutrality from a constitutional perspective, but to neutrality from the perspective of communication and support for Ukraine’s endeavour to stop Russia in its illegal, illegitimate and immoral attack against Ukraine.

Thank you!