The director of Experts for Security and Global Affairs (ESGA), Angela Grămada, gave an interview for the FES/APE foreign policy bulletin in which we discussed how Romania and the Republic of Moldova are helping the neighbouring country Ukraine in the times of the Russian military invasion. Romania and the Republic of Moldova can help the reconstruction of Ukraine through their strategic position, and a combined strategy between Chisinau and Bucharest is needed in this regard. Continue reading the interview in the following lines:

- How important is the economic and logistical support that Romania offers to Ukraine through its ports on the Danube and the Black Sea? How much does this support matter for the economy of Ukraine, taking into account the Republic of Moldova as a point on this logistic route?

- It matters a lot, because the official number given by the Romanian authorities and confirmed by the Ukrainian side is four million tons of grain per month for the exports passing through Romania. And that means money for the state budget. That is, farmers who sell these grains in Ukraine pay taxes and duties to the Ukrainian state budget.

And we know very well that the financial assistance coming from the European Union cannot be used by the Ukrainian side for the purchase of ammunition. European money is allocated for social and economic policies, which is practical assistance for the citizens directly affected by the war, and for the economic and social needs of Ukraine.

When taxes and fees are paid to the Ukrainian state budget, the authorities already have financial resources under their management to be able to make purchases, including ammunition.

All this assistance goes to the front line. So, the organization of this grain transit is extremely important for Ukraine, especially in the context where different countries were involved in this economic circuit of Ukrainian grain export. Also, in many countries involved in this process of helping Ukraine, various crises appeared — communication, economic, political crises, because many politicians used the topic of Ukrainian grain in their election campaigns.

These crises were also penetrated by the Russian propaganda and disinformation. We cannot say that all parties involved in this logistical support were correct or behaved flawlessly. I am sure that certain elements were found on the Ukrainian side that could be reprehensible in this regard. But this belligerent attitude of the partner states regarding the grain transit from Ukraine was certainly not useful to the Ukrainian side.

We should understand that Romania was present in all the conferences for the economic reconstruction of Ukraine — from the meeting in Locarno to the ones recently organized in 2024.

Romania said it is interested in participating in the reconstruction of the civil infrastructure in Ukraine. It is again a very important thing, but in this regard, Romania must think very seriously about its own port infrastructure, storage, roads, i.e. transport for construction materials that will go to Ukraine.

Romania must strengthen its own capacity. Romania insists that the Republic of Moldova should be included in this process of reconstruction of Ukraine. The Moldovan side will have a lot to gain from this, because it will not only be a transit country, but also a translator for the two sides, because Moldova is somehow at the interference of economic realities in Ukraine and Romania.

On the one hand, we have many standards already implemented thanks to the Association Agreement and the free trade agreement between the EU and the Republic of Moldova. On the other hand, there are still certain realities and certain particularities that the Republic of Moldova has in common with Ukraine in terms of the economic model.

The Republic of Moldova can also be included in projects, it can also be a transit country, and it can also be a translator at certain times. Chisinau can serve as a valve for the energy system of Ukraine, because certain electrical networks also operate in the reverse system to and from Ukraine.

I see here an attempt to understand, perhaps not at the level of political actors, but rather at the level of relevant public institutions with attributions in the field, what role can Romania play in the post-war period.

This is an advantage, because Romania is trying to think long-term or rethink the long-term strategy towards Ukraine and include in that strategic partnership intention certain priorities it can develop. We are certainly talking here about the economic reconstruction of Ukraine. This will include security cooperation and assistance for European integration of Ukraine. In this sense, Romanian diplomacy will be much more active in different formats of international cooperation.

Romania is also part of the international tribunal that investigates war crimes against Ukraine committed by the Russian army.

Consistent but discreet military support

- How do you see the military support that Romania has provided to Ukraine since the active phase of the Russian military invasion in February 2022, especially after Romania’s recent decision to deliver a Patriot missile system to Ukraine?

- I think here we really have to start with 2022. We have to say from the beginning that Romania asked the Ukrainian side not to be very vocal about the assistance it will provide or was going to provide starting with the expansion of the war. A kind of “gentleman’s agreement”, in which Romania said that it will help Ukraine, but asked it not be vocal about this”, that is, thanking is enough, but without detailing this assistance.

First of all, it was about transit, i.e. transport corridors, in order for some of the ammunition needed by the Ukrainian army to arrive in Ukraine, from the partner states.

It was also about certain shells or small production that Romania had in stocks. Romania ensured that it also talks with the Hungarian side, so that it is co-opted in this transit for ammunition to Ukraine, because certain transport routes could not bypass that country. And we know it very well that Hungary is not exactly a very good friend of Ukraine.

Further, things evolved in the direction of securing transport corridors for grains. We are well aware that Romania played an essential role on the Danube and the Black Sea. Last weeks, Romania made the decision regarding the delivery of Patriot missile systems. I am not a military expert, but I do not agree with the military experts who claim that we have created a breach, a vulnerability in our defence system. Because as long as you help Ukraine hold out, you won’t need this Patriot system to put it into operation. Also, how does it help that you have four Patriot system and only two of them are operational? I mean, what does it do to have four Patriot systems as part of your security system if Russia is still advancing and intervening further inside the Ukrainian territory? More precisely, it also approaches the mouths of the Danube and Romania’s borders with the Black Sea.

Russia has never hidden that it has quite extensive territorial intentions over Ukraine. It is about the Odessa region, as part of the Novorossia project, which is again being discussed, namely the unification of the four occupied territories or regions of Ukraine.

I believe that Romania made a good decision to contribute to the security of Ukrainian citizens, because the Patriot system will be used in this sense, so that the Ukrainians resist and do not allow Russia to advance and approach Romania’s borders. In addition, if Russia does not advance, the Romanian citizens of the Republic of Moldova are also under the shield. I see a multiplication of positive effects regarding Romania’s decision to deliver this Patriot missile system to Ukraine. Moreover, I do not believe that this decision was taken without being consulted beforehand, that is, at the recent meeting of the Supreme Council of Defense of the country (CSAT) in Romania or without a coordination of these intentions with the NATO partners.

We should pay attention to the fact that the Ukrainian side is very grateful to Romania, without bringing many details, at Romania’s request. Romania helps Ukraine with great discretion.

- As we discussed, Romania prefers not to flaunt the military support it provides to Ukraine for several reasons. How do you see this communication style and is it a suitable one?

- Yes and no. It is good that Romania really supports Ukraine and it is good that the Ukrainian side recognizes this. And it does it consistently, in the sense that we can follow messages of gratitude from the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Dmitro Kuleba, but also from the Presidential Administration in Kiev. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, mentions Romania very often. We also hear such messages from the Minister of Defense in Kiev. Ukraine always thanks Romania.

On the other hand, there are politicians in Romania who use the Ukraine theme for political dividends. Their objective is short-term, to create a scandal in the public space. With such messages, they want to draw the public’s attention to them and say they are concerned about the ethnic Romanians in Ukraine.

Aid for refugees

- How do you evaluate the help given by Romania to the Ukrainian refugees? However, only about 80,000 Ukrainian refugees moved to Romania. Why do you think they didn’t choose Romania?

- I was talking the other day with a Ukrainian diplomat who said that there is a total figure of around 156,000 Ukrainians who have obtained the temporary status of persons in need of protection in Romania. Of this total, about 80,000 are in Romania. Many of them are in the southern part of Romania, i.e. Constanța or Bucharest county, but also near the border with Ukraine. They are basically in the localities that were more or less known to them, even before they arrived in Romania and obtained this status.

On the other hand, from the discussions I had with several Ukrainians who travelled to several countries during this period, i.e. in these two years since the extension of the war in Ukraine, Romania is among those states of the European Union that has the most flexible and reactive protection system, in the sense that when a need arises, at least something is tried to be done to help the situation.

However, we know that payments to Ukrainian refugees from Romania have been very late, but that does not mean it is better in other EU member states than in Romania. Those I spoke with also highly appreciated the fact that Romania had that National Refugee Assistance Plan in place since the first year of the war, from 2022. The states in Ukraine’s neighbourhood that received a large number of refugees could not boast with such a plan.

Romania has tried to manage the relationship with the NGOs that have received quite a lot of money from international donors, so that it does not happen that all the NGOs work in one direction, and that the resources are distributed based on the types of needs of the refugees.

Romania, through its programme, tried to integrate refugees economically, not to keep them in certain communities of big cities. And that made the difference. Why so few though? Because there were prejudices and mutual opinions about Ukraine and Romania.

People, however, moved to localities that are in the immediate vicinity of Ukraine, that is, with the intention of going back. And some of them returned back to Ukraine, they did not go further to other member states of the European Union.

It was quite difficult for Ukrainian refugees to learn Romanian, because it has nothing in common with Ukrainian, which is a Slavic language, and it’s quite difficult to adapt or find a job if you don’t speak English or do not speak another international language that the Romanian side can also speak.

The issue of the Romanian speaking minority in Ukraine

- How do you see the situation of Romanian speakers in Ukraine, which from the perspective of Bucharest, occupied the first place on the bilateral agenda between the two countries? Did Kiev understand this sensitivity of Bucharest and act as such by offering the right to education in the mother tongue to ethnic Romanian speakers?

- This theme was somehow the condition for the dialogue to be able to move forward. And this is not only during this period that we are witnessing now, that is, it is not only during the expansion of the war on Ukraine. Here we can talk about the entire period of thirty or so years of bilateral diplomatic relations. The rights and freedoms of the Romanian minority in Ukraine have always conditioned the development of other lines of interaction and cooperation between the two countries.

At one point, Romania and Ukraine had advanced enough to resume discussions in bilateral working groups. There were commissions and working groups at the presidential and government level.

The Ukrainian side claimed to have amended domestic legislation, adopted the law on language policy, but it was cancelled in February 2014, after the Euromaidan events. However, the Romanian side insisted that the Ukrainian side reconsider the decision. Ukraine said it would amend its domestic legislation and introduce a clause on the languages of European Union member states.

And Romanian is an EU language, because Romania is a member state of the European Union. Things did not evolve in a positive direction, in the sense that even if this was put on paper, the implementation mechanisms were missing.

Later, the discussion was brought back to the moment when those recommendations or conditionalities of the European Commission were formulated and it was again returned to the legislation regarding national minorities on the territory of Ukraine. Romania and Hungary had most objections to this legislation at the time.

Romania preferred to have face-toface talks with the Ukrainian side through diplomatic representatives. The Hungarian side approached the situation in a different way and made a public scandal. From what I understand from the Ukrainian side, Ukraine later adopted the model of the Romanian policy regarding the rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities. But, nowhere in the Ukrainian legislation there is mentioning that Russia is not part of this adopted model, because it is an aggressor state. The Ukrainian side took quite a few steps to meet the Romanian side to discuss the issues.

Propaganda and disinformation

- How do you see the Russian propaganda acting in Romania against Ukraine and what would be the most important false narratives against Kiev in Romania?

- There is this constant theme that Romania must be excluded from NATO, a theme that has been intensively promoted even before the war in Ukraine escalated. That NATO should slightly modify its borders and strategy.

The second big theme was the problem of Ukrainian refugees. Many narratives have been connected to the topic of Ukrainian refugees, such as that they cannot be integrated, that they behave reprehensibly, that the Romanian side does not cope and cannot manage such behaviour on the part of the Ukrainians.

There are also political actors from Romania, i.e. extreme right-wing forces who claimed that the European Union takes our resources, that the European Union takes decisions against the member states, that the EU promotes values that are inappropriate for the Romanian state, and so on.

But here already the problem is in the direction of internal political actors, who, by taking over some themes that we can see in many EU member states, try to influence internal public opinion, and you can’t necessarily accuse Russia of interference.

Another topic that seems to me to be given quite a bit of attention in the public space is what the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Bucharest is doing. The latter, taking up old historical topics and false themes that it brings back into discussion, tries to arouse the dissatisfaction of public opinion in Romania.

Russian propaganda pedals on the idea that Romania still wants to conquer the Republic of Moldova and has imperial claims on both Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova.

Thank you!