Serghei Gerasymiuk, Deputy Executive Director for Regional Initiatives and Director of Neighborhood Programs at the Kyiv-based think tank Ukrainian Prism, gave an interview for the FES/APE foreign policy newsletter. We discussed the potential of trilateral cooperation between Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Romania. Topics included the importance of Moldova staying on a pro-European path, the need for all three countries to develop land, rail, and maritime infrastructure for economic development, and the prospects for Moldova and Romania’s involvement in Ukraine’s post-conflict reconstruction. You can read the full interview below:

At the most recent trilateral meeting in Odesa between the presidents of Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania, cooperation was one of the central themes. Given that Romania is a key logistics route for delivering Western aid to Ukraine, what role can Moldova play in this context?

The first issue we must address is security. Without it, we cannot properly evaluate the efficiency of transit routes or import-export processes. Security is a top priority—not only in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine but also in maintaining political stability in Moldova and Romania.

First and foremost, security is a prerequisite for cooperation. Second, political stability and a pro-European government in Moldova are crucial. We’re aware that important elections are approaching this autumn, and the composition of the future government will determine Moldova’s level of cooperation. A proRussian or weak technical government influenced by pro-Russian factions could seriously limit collaboration.

Assuming security is ensured, we can begin considering strategic investments. Two types of routes are especially relevant. The first is the maritime route via the Black Sea. Russia’s war has significantly limited the use of this route. Moldova effectively lost access to Ukrainian Black Sea ports, while Ukraine’s own capacity is constrained by serious security concerns.

Romania has stepped up by granting access to the Port of Constanța, which has benefited both Ukraine and Moldova. However, Constanța is now overloaded and more expensive than the Ukrainian ports previously used by Moldova. To ensure access to maritime export and import routes, the three countries must enhance cooperation on freedom of navigation and decisions involving littoral states.

Here, the European Union’s involvement is also necessary, especially since two EU member states—Romania and Bulgaria—are directly affected. Romania’s cooperation is vital, as it can represent regional interests at the EU level. Turkey’s role must also be considered. There have already been initial efforts at trilateral cooperation among Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey on clearing naval mines, which are essential for securing navigation. But more is needed. Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania should proactively develop long-term solutions for the Black Sea in any post-war regional format.

How do you view maritime and river cooperation between the three countries, especially regarding grain exports via the Black Sea? The ports of Odesa and Reni in Ukraine and Constanța in Romania are already cooperating. Should Giurgiulești Port in Moldova play a larger role?

Giurgiulești Port—acquired through a territorial exchange between Ukraine and Moldova—has given Moldova a strategic gateway to the sea and a valuable opportunity to strengthen cooperation with its neighbors.

Currently, negotiations are underway for its development with Romanian companies. This is both promising and complex: on the one hand, foreign investment is welcome and much needed; on the other, competition among regional ports is increasing. Such investments also often come with security expectations.

In this context, Constanța remains the key player. As part of the EU and NATO, it offers greater safety than ports in Ukraine or Moldova. Still, Giurgiulești has potential. There is room for expansion, and its attractiveness will depend on strategic investor decisions. Its future role hinges on how investors assess its relevance and competitiveness.

The Transnistrian threat

How important is the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict for Ukraine, given that Russia still maintains troops in the breakaway region? What level of threat does the Transnistrian region currently pose?

Opinions in Ukraine differ. Some are optimistic: they argue that the 1,500 Russian troops stationed in the Transnistrian region—mostly locals with multiple passports and limited training —do not represent a serious threat to a battlehardened Ukrainian army backed by the West.

Others are more pessimistic. In addition to the 1,500 Russian troops (including so-called peacekeepers), the region also hosts a range of security forces: border guards, militia, and the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security. These groups could total up to 10,000 personnel, poorly trained but still capable of sabotage and intelligence operations.

The truth lies somewhere in between. While the troop numbers are relatively small and unlikely to grow significantly, they still pose a threat to Ukraine’s southwestern border—though less so than in the east.

Russia may still attempt to build a corridor to link up with Transnistria. Another concern is the large Soviet-era ammunition depot at Cobasna. Some in Ukraine believe that, with Moldova’s consent, a joint operation to secure the depot would be useful. Others warn that any action there could provoke Russia—or cause a major ecological disaster if the stockpiles were to explode.

So, once again, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. No one really knows what condition the ammunition in Cobasna is in, as the weapons have been stored there for decades, and the OSCE has not had access to monitor their state.

At the same time, there remains a risk of a technological or environmental disaster resulting from any provocation or incident in the area. In short, the Transnistrian region still has the potential to cause additional problems. Moreover, if a pro-Russian government comes to power in Moldova, there could be troop rotations or even an increase in the number of stationed forces.

This is an issue that deserves attention, but it should not be exaggerated. Ukraine’s main security priorities remain in the east and north— not in the south, at least for now.

What support does Ukraine expect from Moldova that is currently lacking? Is more support needed for the Odesa region?

Expectations for support from the Republic of Moldova are not particularly high—at least not beyond political support. Kyiv fully understands that Moldova is dealing with its own set of challenges.

Moldova is facing significant economic difficulties, which limit its ability to provide material or financial assistance. Therefore, the primary form of support expected is political solidarity, particularly within international organizations, as well as cooperation on potential transit routes.

While we often talk about sea routes, it’s also important to emphasize the need to develop railway connections.

For Ukraine, Poland remains the main rail gateway to Europe. However, recent issues—especially those related to differing rail standards—have posed challenges. This is an area where Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine can and should collaborate. Developing a coordinated railway infrastructure would provide a faster and more convenient connection from the Black Sea to European markets.

This brings us back to your earlier question about support. International organizations’ positions on the Transnistrian conflict are also crucial.

From Kyiv’s perspective, the presence of Russian peacekeeping troops in Transnistria—and the fact that some even recently visited the region—is deeply troubling. Such developments raise serious security concerns and are viewed as unacceptable by Ukraine.

Staying on the European path

In September, Moldova will hold crucial parliamentary elections. How important is it for Kyiv that a genuine pro-European governing alliance remains in Chisinau?

That is a critical issue for Kyiv. First, both the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine remain in the same group when it comes to European integration. Of course, there are rumors that the two countries might be decoupled and that Moldova could progress more quickly. However, the window of opportunity extends only until the elections.

If that opportunity is not seized—and we will not know whether a split will occur until after the elections—then both countries are likely to remain grouped together moving forward.

This would mean shared delays for Ukraine, and vice versa, which is why having a proEuropean government in Chisinau is essential from the standpoint of European integration. For the European Union, such a government is also crucial, especially given its position on the Transnistrian region and its willingness (or lack thereof) to allow Russian troops access to the region. A pro-European government is equally important in the context of broader regional trends. The region continues to experience instability and political turbulence, particularly in Ukraine’s neighboring countries.

We have witnessed highly contentious elections in Romania. We have also seen dramatic elections in Poland. Moldova has already experienced such electoral turbulence and is likely to face more.

We may also see snap elections in Slovakia and Bulgaria. In this context, democratic and proEuropean governments are clearly preferable for Ukraine. This is not only because of the need for regional political support but also because if proRussian, weak, or populist governments come to power, the likelihood of continued support for Ukraine will significantly decrease.

How important is it for Ukraine and Moldova to remain aligned on the same pace toward the pro-European path, especially considering that there was a time when decoupling the two countries was discussed? Is it better for them to move forward together or separately on this European path? What is your perspective?

I believe that a joint journey can be viewed positively from both Kyiv’s and Brussels’ perspectives. For the European Union, it is standard practice to admit countries in groups. It is rare to see the EU accept just one country on its own.

Typically, several countries are admitted together. This “package” approach remains the prevailing logic in Brussels. Moreover, the EU needs to demonstrate that at least two countries from the Eastern Partnership have made tangible progress, especially given the sharp decline in the number of states from that group that are still actively pursuing EU membership.

We have already lost Belarus—it is no longer on this path. Now, we are losing Georgia, and Armenia is on the brink. In this context, it is important to prove that the political and financial investments made in the Eastern Partnership have not been in vain.

Additionally, both Ukraine and Moldova can learn from each other and support one another in advancing reforms. Each country also has advocates within the European Union—whether from member states or individual politicians— who are more closely aligned with either Kyiv or Chișinău. By combining these networks of support, both countries stand to gain.

Cooperation in post-conflict reconstruction

What role do you see for Romania and Moldova in the reconstruction of post-conflict Ukraine? How do you envision their involvement in Ukraine’s reconstruction process?

It is essential to consider not only the financial capacities but also the transit potential of Bucharest and Chișinău—that is, Romania and the Republic of Moldova—in the reconstruction of post-conflict Ukraine.

Efficient transit routes for both goods and people will be critical for the reconstruction process. In this regard, cooperation with neighboring countries is necessary, as the Port of Constanța is a major hub, and transit can also take place through the Republic of Moldova.

This transit capacity is key. Beyond that, the energy sector will play a significant role in the reconstruction effort. We must rethink our approach to energy diversification, including the integration of new sources and renewables.

Romania can offer valuable experience in this area, and cooperation between Romania and Moldova is crucial. Likewise, Romania and Ukraine can collaborate to help Moldova achieve greater energy independence. Ukraine can provide gas storage facilities to Moldova, while Romania has the potential to become a major gas supplier, especially if the Neptune Deep project proceeds as planned.

Therefore, there is strong potential for regional cooperation. Additionally, Kyiv is increasingly attentive to the political stances of its neighbors and countries around the world, particularly regarding their support for Ukraine and the conditions attached.

For example, countries that vote against Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly in New York are unlikely to secure a role in the reconstruction process. We are fortunate that Bucharest, Chisinau, and Kyiv have so far stood together on the right side of history.

For countries like Moldova and Romania, which provide unwavering support, the doors to participation in reconstruction efforts and access to related financial instruments will remain open, and Kyiv will certainly welcome their involvement.

Thank you!