The Director of the Institute of Legal, Political and Sociological Research of the Moldovan State University, Victor Juc, gave an interview for the FES/APE Foreign Policy Bulletin in which we discussed potential trilateral co-operation between Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and what such a collaboration would mean. We discussed this triangle of cooperation from the political, military and economic points of view and you can read the conclusions of this interview in full below:

What is the potential of such trilateral cooperation between Ukraine-Romania-Republic of Moldova in the light of the recent discussions held by the presidents of the three countries at the recent summit in Odessa?

I would like to emphasise from the outset that the need to deepen and expand trilateral cross-border cooperation – the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine – has often been mentioned. However, the results are below expectations. There are several reasons for that, among which the lack of interest or lack of trust in potential partners, therefore the results are much more modest, even though trilateral cross-border co-operation has a rather rich history of some more than two decades.

After 24 February 2022, the situation changed in part because an important role here fell to Ukraine, a country that especially in 2023 needed Romania very much to provide grain transport.

In this context, there has been a certain degree of rapprochement between the three parties, but this is rather pragmatic and situational. Nobody in the presidential administrations of Romania, Moldova or Ukraine doubts the need to deepen this cooperation, to extend it, which is why at the moment the parties are looking for new directions to develop cooperation.

Economic co-operation on the Black Sea

I would like to talk about the economic potential of the Black Sea and what a triangular co-operation would mean for the ports of Odessa and Reni in Ukraine, the port of Giurgiulesti in the Republic of Moldova and the port of Constanta in Romania. What would this mean in particular for the transport of grain?

Of course, co-operation is very important, and the ports of Constanta and Odessa are in the foreground, the others are smaller but also very important. The armed conflict has shown that Ukraine is a major exporter of cereals on which the lives of many people in Africa and even in Latin America depend. Inter-port co-operation is absolutely necessary.

It is gratifying that the parties have realised the opportunity of this segment of cooperation and are making full use of the capacities, especially of the port of Constanța. There is another very important element here. Romania is part of the Euro-Atlantic collective defence and Ukraine aspires to this. If Ukraine were to be less cooperative, as it was before, I would even say, by the time of the Russian invasion in 2022, the other partners in the North Atlantic Alliance would have a different attitude towards Ukraine, if they did not want to cooperate with a very important factor in the Euro-Atlantic southern flank. And in this context, it is quite good that Ukraine has moved closer to Romania.

As for the port of Giurgiulesti in the Republic of Moldova, its capacities are smaller, but it is still a fairly important artery that must be used when necessary. The same is true of the port of Reni, but also of other smaller ports on the north-west coast of the Black Sea.

Could Moldova play a bigger role in the logistical routing of Western aid to Ukraine? What is needed to increase this aid from Moldova?

The Republic of Moldova has done a lot in helping Ukraine with road transport. I am a native of the Briceni district, and in 2022 and 2023, practically 40-50 heavy goods vehicles were passing through my village from and to Ukraine every day. So, the Republic of Moldova has done a lot in terms of road communication. But we have fewer opportunities for cooperation on the railways. Railways in the Republic of Moldova are in the doldrums, and the conflict in Ukraine, on the contrary, has not contributed to the development of this segment, but rather to the regression of the railways.

As far as maritime cooperation is concerned, in the Republic of Moldova, even though we have declared ourselves to be a landlocked country, a culture of maritime cooperation has not been formed. Nobody talks about this, and the Republic of Moldova does not have those capacities or skills for maritime cooperation. This is probably also due to the low capacity of the port of Giurgiulesti, especially as it has decreased compared to 15 years ago, when not only cargo, cargoes, but also passengers were travelling.

At present, the Republic of Moldova has less capacity, but I believe that the land arteries must be utilised to the maximum, including through the Three Seas Initiative, where the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine were accepted at the Bucharest summit not only as observer members, but also as associate members, which is very important. On this road route, starting from Poland and ending with Romania, with an extension to the Balkans, the Republic of Moldova could play a much more important role than it does now.

Latent danger from the Transnistrian region

How much does a swift resolution of the Transnistrian issue mean for Ukraine, given that Russia still keeps troops in the breakaway Transnistrian region? What kind of threat does the Transnistrian region pose to Ukraine?

Ukraine must be aware that at any moment there could be an attack on its territory from the Transnistrian separatist region. But we must also bear in mind another fact: the troops stationed on the left bank of the Dniester, both peacekeepers and the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF), are largely made up of locals. This danger is not so great, but it must be taken into account.

The Transnistrian file probably cannot be resolved in the near future. There is an option that I have been constantly promoting for some 20 years – better to keep the conflict frozen than to thaw it and have negative repercussions for the citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

Perhaps what I am about to say is dissonant, but the problem of gas and electricity supplies at the beginning of this year has demonstrated that the people on the left bank of the Dniester River are not fully prepared at present to resolve the Transnistrian problem in the interests of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, as was the case, for example, in 1990 with the unification of the two Germanies. In our case, we have an absolutely different situation.

Resolving the Transnistrian issue is important for Ukraine, which will secure its borders, but above all for the Republic of Moldova, which will become an integrated state, because as long as this problem exists, diplomatic manoeuvring and European integration face certain obstacles.

Of course Ukraine, especially in 2022 and to some extent in 2023, has tried to manoeuvre more diplomatically and mediatically. It has been seen that the Republic of Moldova is not, and has never been, in favour of resolving this conflict by force. The conflict therefore remains practically frozen. I therefore believe that the status quo is better than escalating the situation.

Professor, do you see a possible cooperation between the three countries on the side of debunking falsehoods and fighting hybrid warfare, on the propaganda side, taking into account Ukraine’s massive experience in this respect, which could be shared with the other two countries, Romania and the Republic of Moldova?

It is not only Ukraine that has experience, but also the Republic of Moldova, and more recently 14 Monthly newsletter, No.6 (232), June 2025 Romania as well, because we have seen what hybrid attacks mean there too. I am sorry to say that there is a certain category of politicians in Romania and also a demographic category, particularly young people, who underestimate the danger coming from the Russian Federation.

Once the Russian Federation has come and settled somewhere, it is very difficult to dislodge it. That is why it is very important for the three countries to cooperate in debunking fake news.

Recently, a call for projects was launched by the NATO Liaison Office, including in the Republic of Moldova, and we, together with our Romanian partners, are trying to organise a workshop to which we will also bring Romanian scientists on the issue of combating fake news about NATO in the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine.

All three countries have realised the need to cooperate more closely in combating fake news, and I am glad that in Romania, too, there is a gradual realisation that the situation is absolutely different from what was thought before the presidential elections in 2024.

The importance of maintaining the European course

How important do you think it is from Romania’s and Ukraine’s perspective for the Republic of Moldova to have a genuine pro-European majority again after the parliamentary elections? If we were to imagine that we would not have a pro-European government, but a pro-Russian one in autumn, here in Chisinau, what would this mean in particular for Ukraine?

For Ukraine, it would be a blow below the belt, because we would have not only the Tiraspol authorities, but also the pro-Russian authorities in Chisinau. Such a scenario would be very difficult for Ukraine, because it would lose a very important ally in its neighbourhood. I believe that Ukraine is vitally interested in a pro-European government in the Republic of Moldova, so that together we can continue along the European path in the hope that negotiations will also be opened on the chapters of the acquis communautaire, as well as close cooperation between the two sides.

It is also important for Romania to have a proEuropean government in Chisinau. The citizens of the Republic of Moldova, who also hold Romanian citizenship and have the right to vote, have done their utmost to ensure that Romania, a country which already has a great deal of experience, will continue along the European path.

But it would be a very bad thing for the Republic of Moldova too [if a pro-Russian government came to power]. More specifically, it would mean the EU accession negotiations would come to a halt. Everyone, or the vast majority, talks about the fact that the standard of living in the Republic of Moldova is low and that the country is at the bottom of the queue of European countries. Here, however, we need to follow Romania’s example and use pre-accession and accession funds to help modernise the Republic of Moldova, including the country’s economic development and raising citizens’ standard of living.

In this respect, Ukraine is a very important ally of the Republic of Moldova, just as the Republic of Moldova is for Ukraine. In these circumstances, cross-border co-operation between the three countries is absolutely inevitable.

Hand in hand or separately towards the EU?

Professor, how important is it for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova to go down this European road in tandem or not? There is opposition from some EU countries to Ukraine, but not to Moldova. What do we do in this case: does the Republic of Moldova continue on its own and go down this corridor quickly, or should it go arm in arm with Ukraine?

I understand that there is the problem of decoupling the two states. But we must bear in mind European practices, such as North Macedonia-Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, the 10 countries that achieved integration in 2004, then Romania and Bulgaria in 2007.

The Republic of Moldova, unlike Ukraine, perhaps has no opponents who would not vote in favour of starting negotiations on the chapters for the almost 70 or more than 70 decisions requiring unanimity. In this context, I believe that the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine must continue to move in parallel, even if one is lagging behind at a certain point and the other is moving ahead, because ultimately they will meet at the ‘finish’. And the finish, based on today’s realities, is only being together.

That is why Moldova is interested in the development and modernisation of Ukraine and vice versa. Especially since Ukraine dragged Moldova along with it at the stage of granting candidate status. Now, the Republic of Moldova is pulling Ukraine along, probably by negotiating with those countries, in particular Hungary and Slovakia, which oppose Ukraine’s European integration process.

But the situation may change, including in Hungary, where parliamentary elections will be held next year. We are no longer sure that the current ruling Fides party will win the elections. We will see. But it is important now for Ukraine and Moldova to go their own way, but to support each other.

Early preparations for the reconstruction of Ukraine

Can the reconstruction of Ukraine also be a development opportunity for the Republic of Moldova, and in particular what should the authorities prepare in this respect, because the ground has to be prepared in advance? We see in Romania that a lot of motorways are being built lately, precisely with this idea in mind - for Romania’s development, but also for the reconstruction of Ukraine. What should the Republic of Moldova do in this respect?

I believe that the Republic of Moldova must follow Romania’s example and prepare itself because the armed conflict will come to an end sooner or later. We hope that Ukraine will not lose as much as the Russian Federation wants, but the reconstruction of Ukraine will be a major undertaking. The Republic of Moldova, which, like Romania, is in the immediate neighbourhood, must and will participate very actively, not only at governmental or ministerial level, but also at the level of ordinary people, many of whom would go to the immediate neighbourhood to take part in the construction work and earn some money. Because, indeed, Ukraine will be a great construction site like practically never before.

The Republic of Moldova is being cautious in this respect, it is only talking at the diplomatic level and at the level of the various decision-makers, but it should probably also have an action plan which clearly sets out how it will get involved in the process of rebuilding Ukraine.

Thank you!