Analysis by Anatolie Golea, journalist at TV8, published in the FES/APE Foreign Policy Newsletter

As the Republic of Moldova moves closer to the European Union, the question of the fate of the Transnistrian region upon accession to the EU has been raised increasingly often in recent times. It is obvious to everyone that the left bank of the Nistru is not at all ready for accession to the European Union.

Moreover, both the region’s administration and a significant part of the population are categorically opposed to European integration. It is hard to believe that the situation will change radically in the next three to four years. At the same time, the Moldovan authorities are determined to accelerate the reform process in order to sign the EU accession agreement by 2028. This goal is perfectly justified, as the current “window of opportunity” will not remain open for long.

So how should the issue of reintegration be addressed in the context of accelerated EU integration? As long as EU accession seemed like a mirage, few people gave serious thought to the practical aspects of reintegrating the Transnistrian region.

Until recently, many politicians viewed promises of Moldova’s integration into the EU as “misleading visions” and “false hopes.” However, once these promises began to take shape, Chisinau obtained Brussels’ support, and concrete deadlines were set for Moldova’sintegration into the EU, the issue of Transnistria became urgent.

This is discussed mainly by the opposition and Eurosceptic analysts, who believe that accession should not take place before the Transnistrian conflict is fully resolved and the region is reintegrated. However, they understand that such a strategy would delay European integration for many years, if not indefinitely, keeping the Republic of Moldova in a “grey area” or within Russia’s sphere of influence.

Possible scenarios and options

Aware of this risk, the Moldovan authorities have declared the possibility of a two-stage integration — first the right bank, then the left bank. In Brussels, this option has not been ruled out. It is well understood that if Moldova’s integration into the European Union depended on the prior resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, accession would never take place. Russia has been careful about this since the 1990s, creating the separatist region to blackmail Chisinau. And Moscow’s control over the region continues today, although the military aggression against Ukraine has partially weakened the Russian Federation’s influence on the left bank of the Nistru. The opposition, however, interprets these statements in its own way, accusing the authorities of intending to “join the EU without Transnistria”, which, in their view, would be tantamount to giving up the eastern regions of the country.

At the same time, more and more analysts argue that “the European Union will never accept a country with Russian troops on its territory,” as this would mean that Russian forces would be inside the EU.

But the situation is similar to conflict resolution: if European integration depends on the withdrawal of Russian troops, then those troops will never be withdrawn.

What can Chisinau do? In this situation, the Moldovan authorities can do only one thing: firmly pursue their own agenda. They must continue with the necessary reforms, prepare for the process of European integration and, at the same time, create the conditions for the reintegration of the region. This means, first and foremost, changing the current situation. The government should act more decisively to transform the current “peacekeeping forces” imposed on Chisinau in 1992 into a civilian mission under an international mandate.

At the same time, effective control of the administrative border needs to be established. This step would not mean “recognising Transnistri,” a but would allow for the consolidation of state control on the right bank of the Nistru, combating smuggling, human trafficking and other illegal activities.

This measure is all the more relevant in the context of the war in Ukraine, when the Republic of Moldova is facing an increase in drug trafficking, the risk of arms smuggling and the possible uncontrolled entry of foreigners with dangerous intentions.

Of course, politicians often say that “our citizens live in Transnistria” and that their rights and freedom of movement cannot be restricted. This is true — and no one is suggesting otherwise. But these citizens must understand that control and security measures are in their own interests, for their protection, for national security and to bring the country closer to European Union standards.

In practice, all these measures are concrete steps in preparation for reintegration, especially since the Republic of Moldova enjoys the support of the European Union and neighbouring Ukraine in this process.

Withdrawal of Russian troops and EU accession — parallel processes

As for the withdrawal of Russian troops, this can be resolved relatively quickly within the framework of European integration and parallel reintegration. In reality, there are not many Russian troops left on the left bank of the Nistru — only a few hundred officers, most of whom are awaiting repatriation to Russia. To achieve this, it would be sufficient to organise a few charter flights, even at the expense of the Moldovan government.

The rest, about a thousand contrcat soldiers, are locals who hold both Russian and Moldovan citizenship. If they wish, they can leave — Russia needs soldiers for the front in Ukraine — but they can also stay in their own country.

Opponents will, of course, ask what will happen to the weapons and ammunition depots and how they will be transported to Russia. The answer is simple: transport can take place after the war in Ukraine ends, and some of the ammunition can be destroyed directly on site. But the real question is: who decided that these weapons should be transported to the Russian Federation?

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia assumed the role of successor to the Soviet Union, benefiting from all its assets and liabilities, including those outside the former Union. In return, movable and immovable property located on the territory of the former Soviet republics was to remain where it was. Therefore, military depots and weapons on the territory of the Republic of Moldova should, by right, belong to the Moldovan state.

It is true that in 1991, General Alexei Lebed, commander of the Guard’s 300th Parachute Regiment stationed in Chisinau, transferred a significant part of the military equipment to Russia, but some of it remained in place — including the weapons depots on the left bank of the Nistru. All these issues are, of course, open to debate. But one thing is certain: the processes of European integration and the country’s reintegration should not be mutually exclusive. They must proceed in parallel, for the benefit of all citizens of the Republic of Moldova, on both banks of the Nistru.