Analysis by Evgheni Ceban, journalist at MOST, published in the FES/APE Foreign Policy Newsletter

Can the Republic of Moldova join the European Union without resolving the Transnistrian issue? Theoretically, yes, it can. But in practice, this would require an exceptionally favourable external context, and it would be far more difficult than if the problem were tackled now.

Moldova like Cyprus?

The head of European diplomacy, Josep Borrell, once mentioned the example of Cyprus, arguing that Moldova’s European future should not be “held hostage to the Transnistrian conflict.” But he omitted an important detail: Cyprus achieved such significant progress in European integration only because, at the time, all parties involved believed the issue would be solved before accession — everyone wanted this outcome.

The failure of the Cyprus settlement plan, named after former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and the accession of a divided Cyprus to the EU represented a major failure of Western diplomacy. It is unlikely that anyone in Brussels would want to repeat that scenario. Back then, Turkish troops — belonging to a NATO country — were stationed in Northern Cyprus, whereas in Moldova, it is Russian troops. Given the war against Ukraine, the context is entirely different.

It is one thing to say, as European officials do, that “Russia must not hold Moldova hostage.” It is quite another for the 27 EU leaders to agree to admit into the Union a state on whose territory Russian troops are stationed.

We may comfort ourselves with encouraging statements from Brussels that Moldova will become a member of the European family under any circumstances, but if we rely solely on these promises, we risk stumbling at the decisive moment — right before crossing the finish line. It is unlikely that anyone in Brussels wants such an outcome. Therefore, there will be insistence on concrete steps to resolve the conflict — and this pressure will most likely increase.

A shift in rhetoric after the elections

After the elections, we gradually began to notice a predictable shift in tone — both from the leaders in Chisinau and from European Union officials. There is a growing emphasis on the idea that it would be preferable for Moldova to join the EU as a whole.

Chisinau intends to achieve accession to the European Union “in one step” — together with Transnistria, President Maia Sandu stated the day after the parliamentary elections.

A few days later, Romanian President Nicusor Dan went even further, saying: “The Republic of Moldova’s accession to the European Union can take place together with Transnistria, which could be granted a status similar to that of Gagauzia”.

Recently, European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos expressed her confidence that the Transnistrian issue will be resolved by the time Moldova joins the EU. “There is only one date when the whole of Moldova will join the European Union, with all its territory. On that day, those regions that are not currently administered by the constitutional authorities will also join,” said former Foreign Minister and current Special Envoy for European Affairs Nicu Popescu — effectively contradicting statements he made two years ago in an interview with Politico.

This shift in rhetoric only confirms earlier assumptions.

The crisis in Transnistria: from acute to chronic

The energy and economic crisis in Transnistria has not gone away. At the beginning of the year, Moscow cut gas supplies to the region, aiming to create problems not so much for Tiraspol as for Chisinau — to pressure Chisinau in an election year, forcing it either to negotiate or to bear the consequences. Chisinau, with EU support, managed the situation. But the left bank was left with the fallout.

The crisis shifted from acute to chronic: reduced gas supplies, business closures, hot water and heating outages. Moscow attempted to use gas as a pressure tool, but ultimately only intensified the deterioration of the region it effectively controls. However, Moscow’s influence is limited, particularly in the energy sector.

Today, Chisinau exercises full economic control over Transnistria, and once the Vulcanesti– Chisinau line is completed, Tiraspol will lose its last argument — the ability to cut off electricity to a large part of Moldova.

Russia can accelerate or slow the region’s economic decline, but it is unlikely to reverse the trend. Chisinau must prepare to take responsibility for the region’s future and prepare its economy for a transition to market principles.

Russian troops – the most difficult part of the Transnistrian issue

The only aspect over which Chisinau has no real leverage is the Russian military presence in Transnistria.

The region hosts the Russian Operational Group of Forces (ROGF) — approximately 1,000–1,500 military personnel. They guard the ammunition depots in Cobasna and participate in the trilateral peacekeeping mission. In reality, the ROGF is now the strongest anchor of Russian influence in the region. Most of these “Russian soldiers” are locals with Russian passports. Only about 70 were sent directly from Russia.

To withdraw them without risking unpredictable escalation, Chisinau will have to negotiate with Moscow, mediated by its partners. But if it does not remain passive, Chisinau could significantly improve its negotiating position in the future and, in the best-case scenario, avoid costly and unnecessary discussions with Moscow on many issues.

What should be done?

In short: restore sovereignty over the region.

• Direct communication with citizens on the left bank must be restored. The fears spread by local and Russian propaganda must be dispelled. A clear and confident vision of a unified Moldova’s future must be outlined. If communication is systematic and effective, the self proclaimed regime in Tiraspol will lose its monopoly on speaking “on behalf of the Transnistrian people.”
• Integration of the region must be advanced by expanding the range and quality of services available to residents of the left bank — jobs, medical care, education, social protection. These measures are already included in the government programme — an excellent sign.
• The government must adopt a zero tolerance approach toward repressive legislation, political persecution, and restrictions on human rights and freedoms. Given the changed context and Chisinau’s stronger negotiating position, the Moldovan authorities no longer have any excuse for inaction.
• Safe “exit options” must be created and offered to Moldovan citizens working within the structures — including the security services — of the self-proclaimed PMR, and especially to ROGF contractors. This would allow for the gradual reduction of Russian military potential and a diminishing of Russia’s influence in Transnistria.

None of these measures requires the withdrawal of Russian troops or complex negotiations with Moscow or Tiraspol. But if implemented consistently, the self-proclaimed “transnistrian statehood” will begin to fade before our eyes, and on the left bank of the Dniester, the Russian military presence will shrink to just a few dozen foreigners who have overstayed their permitted stay in the Republic of Moldova.

Transnistria — a bargaining chip for Moldova?

Effective engagement with residents on the left bank can achieve what decades of diplomacy have not. With planned and consistent action, Transnistria will gradually cease to be a source of threats and an instrument of external pressure on Moldova, becoming instead an area of the gradual return of Moldovan sovereignty.

Then the question can be reframed: not whether the Republic of Moldova can join the EU with an unresolved conflict, but why it should leave part of its territory — and above all, hundreds of thousands of Moldovan citizens — in Russia’s hands. The real question is not whether Moldova will be accepted into Europe without the left bank of the Dniester, but at what price it wants to join.