The results of the 2025 parliamentary elections send a clear message: Moldova can no longer be perceived as a land ceded to Russian narratives and influences. With over 50.2% of the vote going to the Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), citizens have reaffirmed their European choice, demonstrating that EU integration is not a passing trend, but a strategic and conscious choice, considers Laurențiu Pleșca, programme coordinator, German Marshall Fund in an analysis published in the FES/APE foreign policy newsletter.

The PAS campaign, centred around the European ideal, reinforced this orientation by portraying Moldova as a “besieged city”, threatened from outside but resilient and capable of defending itself, thus mobilising the pro-European electorate both in traditionally contested areas, in the capital, and in the diaspora.

The record turnout for any parliamentary election – with over 1.57 million voters (including nearly 277,000 outside the country) – lends legitimacy to the election and confirms the democratic maturity of the electorate, even though the pro-Russian opposition, in particular the Patriotic Bloc and groups close to Shor, tried to contest the results with allegations of fraud and protests.

Pro-European mobilisation and the role of the diaspora

The mobilisation of the pro-European electorate exceeded expectations, particularly in the northern regional capitals and among the diaspora. For the first time, PAS gained ground in traditionally proRussian districts such as Drochia, Fălești and Soroca, signalling a structural shift in political preferences. The diaspora, with over 216,000 votes for PAS, was one of the decisive factors, showing that Moldovans living abroad not only follow the country’s developments, but also have a real impact on election results, as we have seen in previous elections.

At the same time, the extremely low turnout of Moldovan citizens in the Russian Federation, with only 4,100 votes, highlights the limits of the pro-Russian strategy to influence the elections. Even though there had been massive pre-registrations, the organisation of voter transport and attempts to mobilise voters through clientelist networks and online propaganda proved ineffective. This failure is not isolated, as it reflects the same trend observed in the country, where vote buying and influence through pressure or illegal means did not have the same effect as in 2024.

The result confirms that the Moldovan electorate, including the diaspora, has become much more vigilant, aware of attempts at manipulation and able to prioritise political options based on real criteria of reform and European orientation. In this context, pro-Russian narratives, electoral corruption and patronage networks are losing their credibility and ability to destabilise the democratic process, thus strengthening Moldova’s resilience against external interference.

Although the victory is decisive, we must not neglect the responsibility that comes with it. PAS has received a strong mandate, but it is not a blank cheque. A large part of the electorate voted not so much for the party’s programme as for stability and the rejection of compromised alternatives.

The promised reforms must be visible quickly: from the justice system, where citizens expect convictions and cases to be resolved, to administrative-territorial reform and the strengthening of local government in marginalised districts. Dialogue with Gagauzia and with the citizens of the Transnistrian region must be a priority in the coming period in order to trigger the processes of decriminalising political corruption in Comrat and reintegration with Tiraspol.

Moreover, beyond reforms and the pressure of European integration, the Republic of Moldova also needs a national reconciliation agenda. Political and geopolitical polarisation has divided society for decades, which is why debates are needed on the major issues that plague society, and this includes engaging the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition in discussions.

The fragmentation of the opposition and the limits of a real alternative

The Patriotic Bloc, which brings together established figures from the old system such as former socialist president Igor Dodon, former communist president Vladimir Voronin, ex-prime minister Vasile Tarlev and former governor of Gagauzia, Irina Vlah, all former political figures in high-level politics, obtained 24.2% of the vote. Although the percentage seems significant at first glance, it rather reflects the real limits of pro-Russian influence in the capital and in the north of the country (only in Gagauzia do we have an unchanged situation). The result indicates a clear weariness with the old elites and confirms that the electorate is looking for new and reformist alternatives capable of delivering concrete results, rather than being mobilised solely by big names or traditional pro-Russian rhetoric. In practice, the Patriotic Bloc failed to reach its traditional electoral base, signalling a structural loss of support and a reduced ability to decisively influence future parliamentary negotiations.

The “Alternative” bloc, with 7.96%, led by figures such as Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban, former presidential candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo, Mark Tkaciuk and former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, failed to establish itself as a relevant alternative to PAS. The results suggest that pragmatic alliances, built on personalities with ambiguous political pasts, no longer mobilise the electorate in the same way, and some voices argue that the National Alternative Movement (MAN) could have achieved a better score if it had participated independently, given its poor performance in the Chișinău elections compared to Ceban’s victory in the first round of the 2023 local elections.

Our Party, with a score of 6.2%, reflects the existence of a niche of voters dissatisfied with the dominant options and looking for political formulas perceived as “anti-system” or closer to local issues. However, the below-expectation results, including in the north of the country where the party has mayors and local networks, suggest that mere presence in the territory no longer guarantees electoral support.

A special case is “Democrația Acasă” (Democracy at Home), which passed the electoral threshold with 5.62% and represents the “surprise party” phenomenon in these elections. Its success was fuelled by a well-orchestrated digital campaign, highlighted by journalistic investigations, similar to recent models in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Romania.

However, even with its online visibility, the party does not have solid structures on the ground, which limits its real impact on the parliamentary configuration. Overall, the fragmentation of the pro-Russian opposition and others, combined with the consolidation of the pro-European vote, gives PAS the opportunity to govern with a clear mandate and to extend its impact in areas where pro-European messages have been more difficult to convey in the past.

At the same time, the results indicate that proRussian forces remain active but are dispersed and lack the cohesion necessary to challenge the outcome or block major reforms. This frees up space for centrist parties, as well as new parties that focused their attention in this campaign on specific issues rather than the systemic challenges highlighted by the larger parties.

Moldovans have passed the test of democratic resilience with flying colours

Ultimately, this election shows that Moldova can no longer be the subject of geopolitical experiments. Citizens have demonstrated resilience, and state structures, supported by the international community, have proven that they can counter external manipulation. PAS’s victory is not only an electoral success, but also a signal to Europe: Moldova can be a stable partner and a bridge of democratic resistance in the wider Black Sea region.

This pro-European success is not only an internal victory, but also a geopolitical milestone for the entire region. It is proof that a small state in a tense area can build mechanisms of democratic resilience that protect citizens’ votes and maintain political stability on the European path, even in the context of a war on its border.

International investments in critical institutions such as the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation or the National Agency for Cyber Security have proven effective, demonstrating that state structures can cope with hybrid threats 12 Monthly newsletter, No.9 (235), September 2025 and ensure electoral security and long-term political stability.

From an economic and political point of view, Moldova is relevant in the region on several levels. On the one hand, due to its long border with Ukraine and the Transnistria region, where Russian troops are stationed, there is a risk of a second front opening up if Moldova were to fall back under Russia’s political control.

In this context, a clear commitment to European integration and support for Ukraine are essential for the regional situation. On the other hand, Moldova serves as a testing ground for Russian destabilisation tactics, as it has a significant European population and a third of its citizens live in the diaspora, holding European passports. This allows Russia to test various narratives and hybrid interference tactics that are then spread throughout Europe.

What can we learn from these elections?

The result of the recent elections confirms the resilience of Moldovan society. Despite multiple crises – from the security challenges generated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine to the energy crisis and internal economic difficulties – citizens remained vigilant and made a clear choice. The independent media and civil society played a decisive role, ensuring public access to accurate information and limiting the impact of manipulation.

For PAS, the victory and consolidation of electoral support open up two major directions. The first relates to the external agenda, accelerating and implementing the full package of reforms necessary for the process of accession to the European Union. The second is internal and aims to reduce disparities between regions, particularly in the north of the country, close to Transnistria, but also in the Gagauzia Autonomous Territorial Unit, where attachment to Russia remains strong. The population in these areas must feel the concrete benefits of closer ties with the EU through improved economic and social conditions.

Moldova’s ability to stay on the European path and counter Russia’s hybrid actions, from vote buying to disinformation campaigns and funding protests, shows how mature the state institutions are and how responsible the citizens are. Moldova’s experience thus becomes a relevant lesson for European Union member states, which need to strengthen their own democracies in the face of the same hybrid threats.