Editorial by Mariana Rață, TV8 journalist for the Foreign Policy Bulletin

Following the latest controversial amendment to the vetting law, it is becoming increasingly clear that Moldova’s justice system has entered a phase of emergency-style reforms. Major legislative changes are now of ten circumstantial, designed to quickly address narrow—typically individual— issues that the governing authorities consider essential. This was the case with the “blitz reform” separating the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (APO) from the National Anti-Corruption Centre (NAC), the rushed initiative to create PACCO, and nearly all recent amendments to the vetting law. The precedent dates back to 2021, when Parliament amended the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office to enable the dismissal of the Prosecutor General—an amendment later declared unconstitutional.

An appointment through the back door

On March 5, the PAS parliamentary majority swiftly passed an amendment to the vetting law, reducing the number of votes required to appoint a foreign member to the External Evaluation Commission— from 61 to 51. This change appears tailored to a single candidate among the six proposed by development partners, and notably the only one publicly rejected by the opposition: Herman von Hebel.

No member of the PAS faction explained why the former head of the pre-vetting commission—who has been the subject of multiple public controversies— was considered the most suitable candidate. Nor was it clear why the majority chose to confront civil society, the opposition, and the media, risking potential setbacks in the European Commission’s next enlargement report, for the sake of this appointment. The speed of the process was equally striking: the law was amended and Hebel appointed in less than 24 hours, amid unprecedented public criticism over the past four years.

“The EU’s love for Moldova is not blind”

Reliable sources suggest that Hebel’s appointment may serve a broader purpose: to bring closure to the embarrassing evaluation process of the newly appointed Prosecutor General, who has struggled to justify the purchase of an apartment. Reportedly, the Commission lacked sufficient votes to confirm Alexandru Machedon. Regardless of the underlying motive, the European Commission made it clear that the ends do not justify the means.

Commission spokesperson Markus Lammert reminded Chișinău that such reforms must be conducted transparently and inclusively, with proper consultation of all stakeholders and in line with the Venice Commission’s opinion. After several instances in which European partners appeared to overlook the government’s hurried “special operations” in structural reform, a clear message has now been delivered: the EU’s support for Moldova is not unconditional. The Hebel case illustrates that the government is willing to sideline transparency, civil society criticism, and even the Venice Commission when political decisions take precedence.

A pattern: from the “Hebel amendment” to the APO–NAC split

This is not an isolated incident. In July 2023, through a nearly identical procedure, Parliament decided to separate the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office from the National Anti-Corruption Center. The change was introduced via an amendment by a single MP, just five days before the final vote on an unrelated draft law.

The amendment was neither consulted with the Government nor with civil society, despite fundamentally altering the operational framework of anti-corruption institutions. No impact assessment or proper justification was provided. Unofficially, the move was explained as an attempt to end tensions between the heads of the two institutions. Notably, the amendment was introduced by the same MP involved in the Hebel case.

At the time, several justice-sector NGOs criticized both the reform and the opaque manner in which it was adopted, but their concerns—along with the Venice Commission’s opinion—were ignored. Shortly afterward, the Venice Commission warned of overlapping competencies, fragmentation of anti-corruption efforts, and weakened institutional capacity. Three years on, those risks have materialized: the separation has effectively paralyzed the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office in tackling high-level corruption. According to multiple sources, the Government is now working on legislation to reverse the reform.

PACCO: reform or pretext?

In February 2025, just months before parliamentary elections, the majority introduced another reform initiative proposing the dissolution of the two specialized prosecutor’s offices and the creation of a new structure—PACCO. The proposal emerged amid tensions between the government and the head of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, as well as accusations that existing institutions were ineffective in combating electoral and political corruption.

Despite strong criticism from both practitioners and experts, the draft law was adopted in first reading just one week after being introduced—without consultations or public debate. The head of APO, Veronica Dragalin, stated that the reform was intended to remove her from office and resigned in an attempt to block its adoption. Subsequently, the urgency surrounding the initiative faded.

In December 2025, the Venice Commission issued a critical opinion on the PACCO proposal, effectively halting any momentum behind it. Meanwhile, the vetting law itself has undergone seven amendments in just three years.

Justice reform and the instincts of power

None of these “emergency reforms” were developed in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, nor were they part of a coherent reform strategy or action plan. Driven by political expediency or emotional reactions, these measures reveal a lack of clear vision regarding the transformation of the justice system.

Today, the justice sector resembles a patient treated simultaneously by multiple doctors who disagree on both diagnosis and treatment.

It is no longer clear where responsibility for shaping justice reform lies. Four years of single-party governance have fostered unhealthy instincts in political decision-making. In sensitive areas such as justice, there is a growing pattern of bypassing legislative procedures, limiting transparency, ignoring civil society input, and consulting the Venice Commission only after decisions have already been made.

A clear vision is urgently needed

A fair justice system cannot be built through back door reforms, nor can one expect society and Euro pean partners to indefinitely overlook such deviations. Successful reform requires a clear and coherent vision.

Policy development must be inclusive, transparent, and grounded in public debate. The Government must engage in careful planning and define clear objectives for reform. Measures driven by urgency or tailored interests are no longer acceptable.

If Moldova aims to conclude EU accession negotiations by 2028, it is effectively attempting to run a marathon at sprint speed. There is no room for mis steps—and even less for derailment.